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I. INTRODUCTION
IN 2007, A SOVIET-ERA war memorial was removed from thecenter square of the Estonian capital, Tallinn.1 The statue’s
removal led to massive cyber operations that shut down the Esto-
nian government, television, and bank websites.2 The cyber op-
erations, likely caused by Russia, came in the form of
“distributed denial-of-service” (DDoS) operations to Estonia’s
web, e-mail, and Domain Name System (DNS) servers.3
This incident popularized the Tallinn Manual and an “effects-
based” approach to categorize cyber operations, which analyzes
the effects of the operations and potential State responses.4 In a
1 See Steven Lee Myers, Estonia Removes Soviet-Era War Memorial After a Night of
Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/
world/europe/27iht-estonia.4.5477141.html [https://perma.cc/CM6B-ZEKE].
2 See Steven Lee Myers, ‘E-Stonia’ Accuses Russia of Computer Attacks, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/world/europe/18cnd-
russia.html [https://perma.cc/JPB5-HBJK]; see also MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPER-
ATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2014).
3 Kevin Poulsen, ‘Cyberwar’ and Estonia’s Panic Attack, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2007,
3:51 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/cyber-war-and-e/ [https://
perma.cc/8LNV-RC6F]; Myers, supra note 2. However, the majority of DDoS at-
tacks came from Russian IP addresses and some even from Russian government
institutions. See Myers, supra note 2; Mark Landler & John Markoff, In Estonia,
What May Be the First War in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2007), https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-cyberwar.4.59011
41.html [https://perma.cc/8LNL-VE6Z].
4 See Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56
VILL. L. REV. 569, 577 (2011) (“[T]he [Estonia] incident arguably reached the
use-of-force threshold.”); David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 87, 91 (2010); Sheng Li, Note, When Does Internet Denial
Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 179, 200–01 (2013) (argu-
ing that under the consequence-based approach, the Estonia incident could be
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similar vein, a political commentator claimed, “Blood will need
to be answered with blood. . . . [T]he next major war the United
States enters will be provoked by a cyberattack.”5 However, these
views lack detailed analyses of the United Nations (U.N.) Char-
ter and customary international law. Other scholars question if
most cyber operations can be an act of war (i.e., a use of force)
under the U.N. Charter.6
In 2016, another nefarious interference incident occurred;
however, this time, over 110 planes and ships in total were af-
fected through the interference of Global Positioning Systems
(GPS) instead of through e-mail and websites, and the likely cul-
prit was North Korea.7 Another significant difference was that
the electromagnetic interference was caused by “jamming”
rather than a cyber operation.8 This raises the question: from an
international law perspective, is a DDoS different from jamming
by State actors?
classified as an armed attack under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter). The Estonia
incident has also led to the naming of the Tallinn Manual (a scholarly exercise of
nonbinding cyber rules for cyber operations) after Estonia’s capital from where
the Soviet-era war memorial was removed. INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, NATO COOPER-
ATIVE CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, 330–37 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis
Vihul eds., 2d ed. 2017) (2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0] (defining a
“use of force” based on the consequences of the cyber action as established by
eight criteria); ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 30–31.
5 RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, THE FIFTH DOMAIN: DEFENDING OUR
COUNTRY, OUR COMPANIES, AND OURSELVES IN THE AGE OF CYBER THREATS 7
(2019).
6 The vast majority of cyber operations deal with subversion, espionage, or sab-
otage which in itself does not rise to the level of an armed attack under the U.N.
Charter. See Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 5, 6,
15, 20 (2012) (“The most widespread use of state-sponsored cyber capabilities is
for purposes of espionage.”); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International
Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2007) (ex-
plaining that information operations “[extend] the use of information technol-
ogy and networks to ‘psychological operations’ (psyops) that convey information
(e.g., broadcasting satellite radio messages) with the aim of manipulating the
views of foreign governments, organizations, or individuals”); see also Matthew C.
Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J.
INT’L L. 421, 428 (2011) (“Armed force is only one instrument of coercion, and
the easiest to identify.”); see also id. at 430 (“Like past efforts to define Article 2(4)
‘force’ as coercion, efforts to expand its coverage beyond armed force so as to
include violations of sovereign domain such as propaganda or political subver-
sion never gained significant traction.”).
7 Stephen Evans, North Korea ‘Jamming GPS Signals’ Near South Border, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35940542 [https://per
ma.cc/7DFG-A977].
8 See id.
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This Article will focus on one type of cyber operation: inter-
ference by cyber means analyzed through jus ad bellum (i.e., use
of force between States). Classifying interference by cyber
means matters because if a cyber operation is considered an
armed attack or use of force, then physical self-defense mea-
sures could be justified under jus ad bellum.9 In other words, if
State A’s interference by cyber means against State B violates jus
ad bellum by being a use of force or armed attack, then State B
could engage in proportionate self-defense measures, including
the use of missiles or ground troops.10 Yet, there are two reasons
interference by cyber means is likely not a use of force.
First, there are adequate means to address DDoS Tallinn-type
incidents in the U.N. Charter rather than speculate how States
may react to cyber operations. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter
defines actions not involving the use of force, including “com-
plete or partial interruption of . . . telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication.”11 Applying the ordinary meaning of
“communication” and “interruption” and analyzing the travaux
préparatoires of the U.N. Charter, communication interrup-
tions (which encompasses interference by cyber means) are not
categorized as a use of force.12
Second, there have been dozens—if not hundreds—of Tal-
linn-type electromagnetic interference events during non-hostil-
ities besides the North Korean jamming of planes and ships in
2016.13 State practice of “jamming” and other electromagnetic
interference has occurred since the 1930s.14 Some examples in-
9 Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99,
102 (2002).
10 Counter-Memorial & Counter-Claim of the United States of America, Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1997 I.C.J. Pleadings 126, ¶ 4.01 (June 23, 1997). “Ac-
tions in self-defense must be proportionate. Force can be used in self-defense,
but only to the extent that it is required to repel the armed attack and to restore
the security of the party attacked.” Id. at 141, ¶ 4.31.
11 See U.N. Charter art. 41.
12 See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 36–38 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1st ed., 1994). Under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT), treaty interpretation begins by looking at the ordinary
meaning. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Article 32 of the VCLT provides that if the meaning of a treaty
is ambiguous or obscure, one can look to the preparatory work, also known as the
travaux préparatoires. See id. art. 32.
13 See JEROME S. BERG, BROADCASTING ON THE SHORTWAVES, 1945 TO TODAY
44–45 (2008).
14 Id. On a basic level, jamming is “the transmission of noise or other interfer-
ing material on the frequency of the targeted station so as to disrupt reception.”
Id. at 44. Several countries jammed broadcasts in the 1930s: Austria against the
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clude (1) the Soviets blocked a U.S. GPS signal, causing naviga-
tion difficulties;15 (2) Iran jammed European Eutelsat satellite
broadcasts;16 and (3) China conducted cyber interference of
U.S. satellites.17
With a focused analysis of U.N. Charter Article 41 and State
practice of electromagnetic interference, the law as it currently
exists is that cyber operations through interference is unlikely to
amount to a use of force.18
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND U.S.
MILITARY DOCTRINE
A. JUS AD BELLUM
Jus ad bellum and jus in bello are part of the larger “just war
tradition” which “provides part of the philosophical foundation
for the modern law of war.”19 Jus ad bellum addresses acts by
States concerning the resort to force.20 In contrast, jus in bello
Nazis, Germany and Russia against each other, and Italy against the Soviet Union.
See id. at 44. After World War II, more widespread jamming occurred when the
Soviets jammed America’s Voice of America broadcast to the Soviet bloc. See id. at
45.
15 David Chandler, Radio Moscow Blocks U.S. Time Signals, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 23, 1982.
16 Paul Sonne & Farnaz Fassihi, Censorship Inc.: In Skies Over Iran, a Battle for
Control of Satellite TV, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970203501304577088380199787036 [https://perma.cc/YA32-
JND7] (stating that Iran “jams channels like the BBC on Western satellites”).
17 U.S.–CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 112TH CONG., 2011 ANNUAL REP.
TO CONG. 216 (2011).
18 The lex lata is the “law as it is exists,” while the lex ferenda is “what the law
should be.” An underlying argument of this article is that many argue the lex
ferenda is the lex lata in cyber operations, which does not appear to have support
in treaty or customary international law. See Ki-Gab Park, Lex Ferenda in Interna-
tional Law (Oct. 23, 2018), https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/park-
kigab_presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8JP-A7VM].
19 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 1.6.4
(May 31, 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. “According to St. Au-
gustine, fallen human nature being what it is, there will always be a presumption
that generation after generation some evil men will choose disorder, violence,
and unjust aggression. At times, the only way to restore order will be to use war as
a just instrument of statecraft.” Michael Novak, Just Peace and the Asymmetric Threat:
National Self-Defense in Uncharted Waters, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 828
(2004). The Just War Tradition had its early development and theory from Saint
Augustine of Hippo who developed the ad bellum criteria of “when” a State may
use force, such as having a “just cause, right intention, [and] competent author-
ity.” Id. at 826–27.
20 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.11; see Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
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addresses conduct during war.21 Additionally, the Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact of 1928 (which attempted to outlaw war in its entirety),
the League of Nations, and the Nuremberg Trials in 1945 fur-
ther developed the custom surrounding jus ad bellum.22 A final
key distinction is that jus ad bellum only deals with the actions of
States rather than the actions of individuals.23
Regarding cyberspace, the structure and rules of jus ad bellum
apply.24 The United States takes the position that existing jus ad
bellum is incorporated into cyberspace, which includes integrat-
ing the international law approach for cyberspace to the U.N.
Charter.25 However, the United States has not developed clear
rules regarding whether jus ad bellum applies in cyberspace.26
¶¶ 191–94 (June 27); see also Jack M. Beard, Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The
Problematic Status of Information as a Weapon and a Target Under Int’l Humanitarian
Law, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 67, 96 (2014) (“[O]nly illegal ‘acts of force’ impli-
cate the jus ad bellum, and only the ‘most grave’ forms of the use of force satisfy
the requirements for an armed attack justifying an armed response under the UN
Charter.”).
21 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.11. According to Saint Augus-
tine of Hippo, in bello involves “how” force is to be used and that it discriminates
between combatants and noncombatants. See Novak, supra note 19, at 826–27.
The jus ad bellum has developed from the Treaty of Westphalia to end the Thirty
Years War, which obviously did not result in an end to war but did outline some
early developments of State sovereignty. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks
on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38
STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 214 (2002).
22 See Jensen, supra note 21, at 214–15.
23 See Novak, supra note 19, at 827. The proposition that only a state can de-
clare war derives from Saint Augustine’s principle that only a competent author-
ity may declare war. See id.; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.11.1.1.
24 Former Legal Advisor of the U.S. State Department, Harold Hongju Koh,
stated, “states have long had to sort through complicated jus ad bellum questions.
In this respect, the existence of complicated cyber questions relating to jus ad
bellum is not in itself a new development; it is just applying old questions to the
latest developments in technology.” Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in
Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Harold Hongju Koh to the US-
CYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. Meade, MD, Sept. 18, 2012, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 8 (2012) [hereinafter Koh Remarks].
25 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 21. This is further evidenced by the 2012 U.S.
National Defense Authorization Act which clarified cyberspace is subject to the
existing laws of armed conflict and the DoD Law of War Manual, which indicated
that the Article 2(4) prohibition on force and threat of force in the U.N. Charter
under jus ad bellum applies to cyberspace. See National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2012); DOD
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 16.3.1.
26 See Waxman, supra note 6, at 432–33 (observing that the United States ap-
pears to be trending towards a consequence-based approach to use of force in
cyberspace).
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The United States is not alone in indicating that jus ad bellum
and the law of armed conflict apply to cyberspace; similar affir-
mations come from Australia, China, Cuba, the European
Union, Hungry, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Qatar, Russia, and
the United Kingdom (U.K.).27 Additionally, Russia has drafted
rules for the U.N. that propose limitations on cyber-attack rules,
indicating a general view that cyberspace can be viewed through
the prism of jus ad bellum.28
B. DEFINITION OF CYBER OPERATIONS AND JAMMING
A basic understanding of military doctrine and definitional
framework is necessary to analyze jus ad bellum in cyberspace.29
Although a favorite term of political commentators, the phrase
“cyber war” is not often used in the legal analysis because the
term can lead to misleading analogies.30 “Cyber operations” is a
more accepted and appropriate term.31
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines cyberspace opera-
tions as the “employment of cyberspace capabilities where the
27 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 21–22.
28 See Li Baodong (Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of
China), Vitaly Churkin (Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation),
Sirodjidin Aslov (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Tajikistan) &
Murad Askarov (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan), Letter
Dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Feder-
ation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,
3–4, U.N. Doc. A/66/359, annex (Sept. 14, 2011); see also Waxman, supra note 6,
at 456; Beard, supra note 20, at 142 (“Russia launched a cyber arms control initia-
tive at the UN General Assembly (fashioned as an ‘International Code of Con-
duct’) with a troublesome content-related focus, containing prohibitions on
‘information terrorism’ as well as new ‘information security’ concepts that essen-
tially gave unwelcome words the status of weapons.”). While the sincerity of Rus-
sia’s desire to limit cyber-attacks is questionable due to their own repeated use of
cyber tools and development, their proposal gives some indication that they view
cyber operations according to the jus ad bellum. See Waxman, supra note 6, at 456.
29 Other sections will show how there is no substantial difference between in-
terruptions or disruptions of the electromagnetic spectrum from a legal stand-
point, whether it be cyber operations, jamming, blinding, spoofing, or any
related concepts based on Article 41 of the U.N. Charter and State practice.
30 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 10–11. But see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICTS 26 (2019), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-report-
ihl-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts [https://perma.cc/F6EK-
4RPP] (“The ICRC understands ‘cyber warfare’ to mean operations against a
computer, a computer system or network, or another connected device, through
a data stream, when used as means or methods of warfare in the context of an
armed conflict.”).
31 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 10–11.
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primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyber-
space.”32 Cyberspace operations can be shortened to “cyber op-
erations.” The use of cyber operations is a growth “from the
[i]nternet’s interconnectivity and other new forms of communi-
cation.”33 New technology in cyberspace does not change the
nature of jus ad bellum.34
Two definitions of jamming assist in the jus ad bellum analysis
of cyber operations. First, jamming involves overloading fre-
quencies with noise so that communications cannot get
through.35 Second, the DoD defines electromagnetic jamming
as the use of the electromagnetic spectrum “with the intent of
degrading or neutralizing.”36 Therefore, by combining these
concepts, jamming can be defined as the deprivation, limitation,
or degradation of the use of communication or radar signals
through overloading frequencies or other methods of control-
ling the electromagnetic spectrum through electromagnetic
energy.37
Jamming is considered a form of harmful interference, which
can also include “spoofing.”38 The transmission of noise to the
targeted station is generally meant to disrupt reception.39 Satel-
lite jamming may interfere with a satellite’s capabilities,
“preventing it from broadcasting at all.”40 Interference with
satellites can happen virtually by interfering with the electro-
32 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, INFORMA-
TION OPERATIONS II-9 (2014), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doc-
trine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RZ5-YW2V] [hereinafter JP FOR
INFORMATION OPERATIONS].
33 Hollis, supra note 6, at 1028–29.
34 Id. at 1039–40, 1041 n.70.
35 Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with
Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 101, 104 (2014); see
also BERG, supra note 13, at 44.
36 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13.1, ELEC-
TRONIC WARFARE GL-7 (2012), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VE3G-XK3U] [hereinafter JP FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE].
37 ELECTRONIC WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS 9-3, 10-5 (2000), https://falcon.blu
3wolf.com/Docs/Electronic-Warfare-Fundamentals.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4JE-
D8B7].
38 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 32 (1999), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/
io-legal.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JH-562L].
39 See BERG, supra note 13, at 44.
40 Jonathon W. Penney, The Cycles of Global Telecommunication Censorship and Sur-
veillance, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 693, 730–31 (2015). Satellite jamming is done by
interfering with the uplink or downlink connections between Earth and the satel-
lites based in space. Mountin, supra note 35, at 128; see Michel Bourbonnière,
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magnetic communications system.41 Additionally, some input-
output (IO) operations are a specific type of manipulation of
the electromagnetic spectrum.42
A practical application of jamming and interference by cyber
means can be seen in two different disruption events involving
Moscow. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union jammed western short-
wave radio broadcasts in Poland and Lithuania to prevent politi-
cal unrest directed against Moscow.43 This jamming of the
electromagnetic spectrum was similar to interference by cyber
means in Estonia in the Tallinn Square incident.44 The DDoS
operations and the jamming operations both involved degrada-
tion of capabilities so severe that functions were lost.45
Interference by cyber means should be treated similarly to
jamming in a jus ad bellum analysis. The DoD Law of War Manual
draws this connection as well, finding that “bombardment of a
network hub” and “the jamming of wireless communications”
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Jus in Bello Satel-
litis, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 43, 51–52 (2004).
41 Deborah Housen-Couriel, Disruption of Satellite Transmissions Ad Bellum and
In Bello: Launching a New Paradigm of Convergence, 45 ISR. L. REV. 431, 436 (2012).
Jamming can also involve interference with a ground station for satellite jamming
or between any transmitter and receiver on Earth. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FM 3-
14, ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS para. 2-83 (2019) [hereinafter ARMY SPACE OPERA-
TIONS]; see generally ELECTRONIC WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 37.
42 IO captures the more traditional field of psychological operations and infor-
mation gathering that are as historic as the history of war itself. See Hollis, supra
note 6, at 1030–31. According to the DoD, IO also incorporates “electronic war-
fare” which uses electromagnetic and directed energy to control or attack the
adversary’s electromagnetic spectrum. JP FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS, supra
note 32, at II-12; Hollis, supra note 6, at 1031; see also ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 69.
Electronic warfare also contributes to IO by “techniques in a variety of combina-
tions to shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial use of the [electronic magnetic
spectrum].” JP FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE, supra note 36, at I-14; see also Eugenia
Georgiades, William J. Caelli, Sharon Christensen & W.D. Duncan, Crisis on Im-
pact: Responding to Cyber Attacks on Critical Information Infrastructures, 30 J. MAR-
SHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIV. L. 31, 42 (2013) (listing targets of electronic warfare
other than computer systems).
43 Flora Lewis, Ripple from Poland: Europeans Will Feel It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
1980), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1980/08/28/
111284168.html (noting that the Soviet Union went so far as to shut down all
television broadcasts in the eastern part of Poland during the visit of Pope John
Paul II).
44 Poulsen, supra note 3.
45 Further examples are in Section IV in the discussion about customary inter-
national law. However, this initial example is to highlight the similarities of jam-
ming and DDoS.
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are in the same category.46 Thus, if jamming is not a use of
force, then timeout errors (like DDoS) and other interference
by cyber means are not a use of force either.47
C. TREATY ANALYSIS MISSING FROM EFFECTS-BASED ANALYSIS
The Tallinn Manual and other effects-based approaches ap-
pear to support the existing jus ad bellum analysis for jamming.48
The Tallinn Manual finds that, during peacetime, jamming is
not internationally permitted; however, it does not classify jam-
ming as a use of force even if employed by the military.49 Others
take the logic of the Tallinn Manual and go a step further, find-
ing that jamming satellites can be a use of force.50 The Tallinn
Manual and the effects-based approach do not base this analysis
on treaties or customary international law; instead, they rely on
a theoretical approach of what States may do.51
This approach is misguided because States’ use of force under
the jus ad bellum analysis is best analyzed under customary inter-
national law and treaties.52 In Article 38(1), the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) recognizes international conventions, cus-
tom, and general principles of law as the building blocks for
46 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 16.1.2.2. (“[T]he bombard-
ment of a network hub, or the jamming of wireless communications, would not
be considered cyber operations” that are more physically destructive “even
though they may achieve military objectives in cyberspace.”).
47 Poulsen, supra note 3; Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in
Cyberspace: An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F.
L. REV. 43, 55 (2009); Hollis, supra note 6, at 1041 (stating that the instrumental-
ity approach concludes cyber operations are not armed force because they lack
characteristics associated with traditional military coercion).
48 Rule 62 of the Tallinn Manual provides that “[t]he International Group of
Experts concluded that the ITU regime governing use of the electromagnetic
spectrum and associated earth orbits is well-established and applicable to their
use for cyber activities.” TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 296.
49 See id. at 297 (stating that during peacetime, states have engaged in jamming
operations, which is governed by the ITU and not permitted, whereas military
radio interference operates under a different framework than the ITU). At first,
the Tallinn Manual appears to treat interference along the electromagnetic spec-
trum the same: whether it is jamming or a DDoS, the application to the jus ad
bellum is effects-based. See id. at 296 n.726.
50 See Mountin, supra note 35, at 196, 123 (“[E]xisting norms are not equipped
to handle the range of impacts emerging as more and more State and non-State
actors engage in satellite signal interference.”).
51 See Waxman, supra note 6, at 436 (“A significant problem with this [conse-
quence-based] view is that it fails to draw a principled distinction between cyber-
attacks and other nonmilitary political or economic interference, which can also
cause significant harm.”).
52 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 1039.
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international law interpretation.53 International law is primarily
expressed in treaties or international customs, and it is not
based on desired outcomes.54
The U.N. Charter has particular importance because it em-
bodies both customary and treaty law.55 The “present corner-
stone of the jus ad bellum matrix is the U.N. Charter, in
particular its Article 2(4) and Chapter VII.”56 Placing the proper
weight of the U.N. Charter results in a jus ad bellum analysis that
focuses on the modality of States’ actions.57
D. USE OF FORCE AND ARMED ATTACK
Under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, all member nations
“shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”58
Therefore, an intervention involving an armed force is a use of
force and violates this basic tenant of the U.N. Charter.59 This
understanding regarding the use of an armed force is also ac-
cepted as part of customary international law binding all States
in the world.60
The most serious form of a use of force is an “armed attack”
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.61 An armed attack triggers
the inherent right to self-defense.62 Jus ad bellum limits the right
53 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. Judicial decisions and teach-
ings of highly qualified publicists can be a subsidiary means for interpreting inter-
national law. Id.
54 MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW AND ICAO 3 (3d ed. 2016).
55 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed.1996). Custom had historically taken preeminence over treaty in de-
fining customary international law. See id.
56 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 43. For example, the U.N. Charter permits the
inherent right to individual or collective self-defense under Article 51, in part
because this is a just cause for military action. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see also
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.11.1.1 n.186.
57 The U.N. Charter’s focus on the modality has been labeled by some as an
“instrumentality” or instrument-based approach. Hollis, supra note 6, at 1040–42
(stating that the instrumentality approach has some support in Article 41 of the
U.N. Charter but runs into issues when applied to shutting down communication
systems).
58 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
59 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 428–29.
60 Id.; ROBERT KOLB, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 66
(Katherine Del Mar trans., 2010).
61 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
62 Id.
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to self-defense to armed attacks.63 However, the United States
considers a use of force and an armed attack in the same cate-
gory because both give rise to the right of self-defense.64
According to the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States decision,
the “most grave [form] of the use of force” is an armed attack.65
Attacks are distinguished based on their “scale and effects.”66
The scale and effects test also demonstrates that not all violent
military actions rise to armed attacks, and some military actions
may be classified at a lower standard as a “mere frontier
incident.”67
A recent example of a mere frontier incident is the clash be-
tween Indian and Chinese military forces in the Ladakh region,
in which twenty Indian troops were killed.68 In that case, neither
side indicated there was an armed attack while blaming the
63 See Beard, supra note 20, at 78 n.42 (citing Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6)). The right to use armed force in self-defense
“is also dependent on meeting a high threshold for attribution of the armed
attack.” Id.; see also Ryan Patterson, Silencing the Call to Arms: A Shift Away from Cyber
Attacks as Warfare, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 969, 985 (2015).
64 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.11.5.2 (“The United States has
long taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies
against any illegal use of force.”); see also Waxman, supra note 6, at 427 (“The
dominant view in the United States and among its major allies has long been that
the Article 2(4) prohibition of force and the complementary Article 51 right of
self-defense apply to military attacks or armed violence.”). The U.S. position, that
an armed attack and a use of force both give rise to a use of force, is not accepted
by the majority of nations. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19,
§ 1.11.5.2.
65 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27); see also KOLB, supra note 60, at 77
(noting the ICJ has “always insisted on the fact that all uses of force are prohib-
ited under article 2 § 4 but not all these uses are automatically armed attacks
triggering the application of article 51.”).
66 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 103, ¶ 195. Low level uses of force, therefore, do
not trigger the inherent right to self-defense because they do not rise to the level
of an armed attack under Article 51. See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 45.
67 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 103, ¶ 195. Additionally, a “use of force” requires
an element of coercion. “Armed force is only one form of coercion and is the
easiest to identify” and “[l]ike past efforts to define Article 2(4) ‘force’ as coer-
cion, efforts to expand its coverage beyond armed force so as to include viola-
tions of sovereign domain such as propaganda or political subversion never
gained significant traction.” Waxman, supra note 6, at 428–30.
68 Soutik Biswas, India-China Clash: 20 Indian Troops Killed in Ladakh Fighting,
BBC NEWS (June 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476
[https://perma.cc/E4T5-N7XF]. “China did not confirm any casualties, but ac-
cused India” of crossing the border. Id. India also accused China of crossing the
border. Id.
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other country for the skirmish.69 Thus, small border incidents
like this one—even those that result in the loss of life—are not
considered an armed attack under the U.N. Charter.70
Some effects-based proponents reject the scale and effects test
developed in the Nicaragua decision, finding that qualitative in-
dicators based on the consequences (e.g., number of deaths)
are more in line with current international law.71 The problem
with dropping the scale and effects test for a multi-faceted crite-
ria test is that doing so blurs the lines of what constitutes a use of
force. An effects-based model can lead to the conclusion that
virtually any cyber operation could be an armed attack.72 With-
out reason, this lack of clarity in the jus ad bellum analysis could
lead to a more opaque approach to cyberspace based on policy
goals rather than international law. Such an approach is also
problematic because even military action resulting in loss of life
is not necessarily an armed attack.73 Thus, it is unclear how
much loss of life caused by a cyber operation would constitute
an armed attack.
Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the effects-based
approach is that it could upend developed norms on what is
considered “coercion” for a use of force analysis. For example,
the classification of economic and political coercion as not a use
of force is supported by the travaux préparatoires of the U.N.
Charter.74 The Tallinn Manual’s effects-based approach appears
to endorse the traditional view of political and economic coer-
cion.75 Yet, the economic impact of cyber operations can have
much more devastating consequences and would, thus, upend
conventional coercion norms.76
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶¶
311, 314, 319 (Oct. 10).
71 See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 573, 589.
72 See Reese Nguyen, Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 101
CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1123 (2013).
73 See Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. at 451–52, ¶¶ 311, 314, 319.
74 Schmitt, supra note 4, at 573–74. Brazil attempted to include a provision to
define the “use of force” as including economic sanctions, but this was rejected
and is not reflected in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. See Beard, supra note 20,
at 117 n.198.
75 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 331; see also Schmitt, supra note 4, at
573–74.
76 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 1042.
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The Tallinn Manual creates a “Jekyll and Hyde” approach to
the U.N. Charter because cyberspace is treated as though it is
outside of the U.N. Charter framework for physical effects-based
cases but inside the U.N. Charter framework for political and
economic coercion.77 The travaux préparatoires supports the ob-
scure treatment of cyberspace; the Brazilian delegation pro-
posed that Article 2(4) include a prohibition against the use of
“economic measures,” but the proposal was rejected.78 Likewise,
efforts to define “force” to include “propaganda or political sub-
version never gained significant traction.”79
The rejection of economic and political coercion as force re-
inforces the idea that the U.N. Charter is limited to traditional
military instruments.80 Thus, the Tallinn Manual runs afoul by
going outside the U.N. Charter in its classification of certain
cyber operations not as uses of force while attempting to remain
under the U.N. Charter for political and economic coercion.
Such a contradictory classification runs counter to Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises (VCLT), which
states that a treaty must be read as one congruent document.81
E. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH MISSTEP
Harold Koh implicitly endorsed some of the effects-based ap-
proaches, stating that “cyber activities that proximately result in
death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be viewed as
a use of force.”82 Likewise, the DoD references the effects-based
approach in some manuals and doctrines.83 Such references are
77 See id.
78 See U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Elev-
enth Meeting of Committee I/1, ¶¶ 7–8, U.N. Doc. 784, I/1/27 (Vol. VI) (June 5,
1945) [hereinafter Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting] (rejecting the Brazilian del-
egation’s suggested inclusion of a prohibition against “economic measures”);
U.N. Conference on International Organization, Amendments to the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals Presented by the Brazilian Delegation, at 252–53, U.N. Doc. 2, G/7
(e)(4) (May 6, 1945) [hereinafter Proposal Presented by the Brazilian Delegation]; see
also Beard, supra note 20, at 117 n.198.
79 Waxman, supra note 6, at 430.
80 Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
525, 536–37 (2012) (“By explicitly excluding economic coercion from the defini-
tion of force in the drafting of Article 2(4), and implicitly rejecting ideological
and diplomatic instruments as well, the drafters signaled that the determination
of whether a nation has used force in violation of Article 2(4) focuses only on
military instruments.”).
81 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31.
82 See Koh Remarks, supra note 24, at 4.
83 See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 16.2.2 n.15.
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leading some commentators to speculate that the United States
has embraced the effects-based approach.84
However, both Koh and the DoD do not go so far as to en-
dorse the Tallinn Manual and the effects-based approach en-
tirely. Koh also indicated that the old analysis of jus ad bellum
should not be rejected for new technology.85 Additionally, the
DoD Law of War Manual places the main jus ad bellum analysis
for cyberspace on the U.N. Charter.86
More recently, in March 2020, the DoD General Counsel
commented in public remarks that initiatives like “the Tallinn
Manual can be useful to consider, but they do not create new
international law.”87 Such a statement seems to indicate that not
everything in the Tallinn Manual or everything in the effects-
based analysis is considered an accurate restatement of the
United States’ view of international law in cyberspace. The DoD
General Counsel’s March 2020 remarks also drove home that
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and customary international
law should be the basis for the “use of force” analysis.88
However, the General Counsel at least partially endorsed
some aspects of the effects-based analysis, stating “DoD lawyers
consider whether the operation causes physical injury or dam-
age that would be considered a use of force if caused solely by
traditional means like a missile or a mine.”89 Despite leaving
room for some type of effects-based analysis, the explicit callout
of the Tallinn Manual demonstrates that the DoD is not ready to
completely abandon the historical analytical framework for the
use of force as applied to cyber operations.90
84 See, e.g., Catherine Lotrionte, Reconsidering the Consequences for State-Sponsored
Hostile Cyber Operations Under International Law, 3 CYBER DEF. REV. 73, 81, 104 n.49
(2018).
85 See Koh Remarks, supra note 24, at 3, 7–8.
86 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 16.3.1.
87 Paul C. Ney, Jr., Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Remarks at U.S. Cyber
Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020) (transcript available at https://
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-
counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/ [https://perma.cc/
5AP6-A54T]) [hereinafter Ney Remarks].
88 Id. (noting that whether “a military cyber operation may constitute a use of
force” is based on the analysis “within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter and customary international law”).
89 Id.
90 See id. (“Initiatives by non-governmental groups like those that led to the
Tallinn Manual can be useful to consider, but they do not create new interna-
tional law, which only states can make.”). A further indication in the speech that
the DoD does have the expansive view of use of force for cyberspace is that the
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Besides the United States, many other nations have made
public statements or indications of some version of the effects-
based approach to determine if a use of force has occurred
where “traditional” kinetic force could have caused comparable
damage.91 Specifically, Australia, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, and the U.K. have had public officials make statements
that blatantly or implicitly endorse this view.92
In determining if interference by cyber means is a use of force
in cyberspace, an analysis based on the U.N. Charter—not just
potential State actions—is required.93 It is nearly impossible in
international law to run counter to the U.N Charter.94 Under
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, in the event of any conflict be-
tween the obligations of the U.N. Charter and any other interna-
tional agreement, “[the] obligations under the [U.N.] Charter
shall prevail.”95 The VCLT reiterates the obligation to adhere to
the U.N. Charter above all other treaties.96
The remaining Sections, dealing with Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter and customary international law for electromagnetic in-
terference, demonstrate that cyber interference is like other
electromagnetic interference and should be addressed by the
U.N. Charter and customary international law under a jus ad bel-
lum analysis.
DoD will apply some jus in bello principles as a matter of policy because a cyber
operation may not technically constitute a use of force. Id. (“[J]us in bello princi-
ples, such as military necessity, proportionality, and distinction, continue to
guide the planning and execution of military cyber operations, even outside the
context of armed conflict.”).
91 Przemyslaw Roguski, Application of International Law to Cyber Operations: A
Comparative Analysis of States’ Views, THE HAGUE PROGRAM FOR CYBER NORMS POL’Y
BRIEF, Mar. 2020, at 9.
92 Id.
93 See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 38, ¶ 1.
94 See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 1216. Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: “Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 26. Therefore, not
operating within the bounds of the U.N. Charter would leave the United States,
or any other country, running afoul of its treaty obligations.
95 U.N. Charter art. 103.
96 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 30, ¶ 1; cf. 1
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 55, at 1215–16.
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III. ARTICLE 41 OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND CYBER
OPERATIONS
A. ARTICLE 41 OF THE U.N. CHARTER: PLAIN MEANING
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter is included in Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter.97 Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter covers the
collective security actions that the U.N. Security Council can au-
thorize in the case of threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression.98 Chapter VII actions can involve a
use of force if they are Article 42 actions.99 Actions not involving
a use of force are contained primarily in Article 41.100 Article 41
states, “The Security Council may decide what measures not in-
volving the use of armed force are to be employed. . . . These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic rela-
tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.”101
Article 41 covers measures that are not force with the phrase
“not involving the use of armed force.”102 Thus, the list of ac-
tions is classified explicitly as not a use of force.103 Under Article
97 U.N. Charter art. 41.
98 Id.; KOLB, supra note 60, at 26. Of note, a State’s action need not qualify as
an “act of aggression” for the Security Council to take action, and the Security
Council could also act in the event of a breach of the peace or a threat to peace.
Id. at 80. In a similar vein, the Security Council’s Chapter VII authorized actions
may infringe on the sovereignty of a State and even intervene in a State’s domes-
tic affairs. See BENEDETTO CONFORTI & CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 202 (4th ed. 2010).
99 Article 42 of the U.N. Charter states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. Charter art. 42; see CONFORTI & FOCARELLI, supra note 98, at 259.
100 U.N. Charter art. 41; KOLB, supra note 60, at 79; see also CONFORTI & FO-
CARELLI, supra note 98, at 231–34.
101 U.N. Charter art. 41 (emphasis added).
102 Id.
103 The U.N. Security Council has referenced Article 41 to stress that it did not
intend to authorize forcible action. There is a slight difference in the wording in
Article 2(4) which prohibits Members from the “use of force,” whereas Article 41
has the additional word “armed” in front of “force.” U.N. Charter arts. 2 , ¶ 4, 41.
Some commentators have speculated that the use of the word “armed” in front of
Article 41 is a qualifier that may distinguish Article 41 from Article 2(4). See
Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International
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41, actions that do not rise to the level of a use of force include
the interruption of all postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
forms of communication.104
The list of U.N. Security Council actions under Article 41 has
the nature of sanctions because of the actions’ focus on eco-
nomic impact.105 Additionally, the list of actions does not have
to be imposed in its entirety, but the cumulative application of
all the measures would have the effect of near or total
isolation.106
Giving “communications” its ordinary meaning finds support
in the purpose of Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. Under Article
31(1) of the VCLT, a treaty is interpreted by its object and pur-
pose.107 The object and purpose of Article 41 are to cover the
interruption of communication of all types.108 If some forms of
communication were intended to be excluded, then the phrase
“other means of communication” would not have been in-
cluded. “ ‘[O]ther means of communications’ fairly encom-
passes computer communications and communication over
computer networks.”109 Thus, the context of Article 41 also de-
notes all communication interruptions must be treated the same
whether they are over telephones, wireless signals, broadcasting,
radio interference, or computer network connections.110
The travaux préparatoires of the U.N. Charter also confirm the
ordinary meaning of “interruption” and “communication.”111 At
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 904–05
(1999). However, the text’s plain meaning and the structure of the U.N. Charter
support a congruent interpretation of “force.” See Waxman, supra note 6, at
427–28. For example, the preamble of the U.N. Charter sets out the goal “that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” U.N. Charter
preamble.
104 KOLB, supra note 60, at 82–83.
105 See CONFORTI & FOCARELLI, supra note 98, at 233–34.
106 Id.
107 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31, ¶ 1.
108 See KOLB, supra note 60, at 83. Although, practice has shown some limita-
tions to limiting communication for humanitarian reasons if the situation has
called for it. Id.
109 David J. DiCenso, Information Operations: An Act of War?, AIR & SPACE POWER
CHRONS., July 31, 2000, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/jour-
nals/Chronicles/dicenso1.pdf [https://perma.cc/89YA-MGGT].
110 See id.
111 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, arts. 31, ¶ 1,
32; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at
36–38 (stating that under Article 32 of the VCLT, preparatory works, such as the
travaux préparatoires, can be used to confirm the meaning resulting from the ap-
plication of Article 31).
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the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Soviet Union proposed
interruption of communications as action short of armed
force.112 After some discussion, the United States and the U.K.
representatives agreed to include interruption of communica-
tion in the draft version of what would become Article 41, which
was submitted to the San Francisco Conference.113
Further discussions at the San Francisco Conference included
the Greek representative’s remarks that the Security Council is
empowered to take a range of measures. The representative in-
dicated that the interruption of communication or severance of
diplomatic relations was a less severe option, and it differed
from sanctions by armed forces.114 There were no objections to
the Greek representative’s observation on this point.115 The rep-
resentatives who drafted the U.N. Charter likely believed the Se-
curity Council had wide latitude in interruption of
communications.
Some may argue that the communication interruption under
Article 41 only applies to communication between States, and
the drafting of Article 41 was meant to be a form of keeping
communication from going in and out of a country, not within a
country.116 The modern example would be an “infoblockade,”
which “blocks all electronic information from entering or leav-
ing a State’s borders.”117 However, the profound changes in
communication essentially make all electronic communications
cross State borders, especially in the age of satellite communica-
112 See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1945, at 466 (1958).
113 Id.; U.N. Conference on International Organization, Observations of the Gov-
ernment of Venezuela on the Recommendations Adopted at the Dumbarton Oaks Confer-
ences for the Creation of a Peace Organization, at 211, U.N. Doc 2, G/7(d) (1) (Oct.
31, 1944) [hereinafter Observations of the Government of Venezuela] (“[M]easures,
not including the use of armed force . . . might include total or partial interrup-
tion of railway, maritime air, postal, telegraphic, radiotelegraphic and other
communications.”).
114 See U.N. Conference on International Organization, Verbatim Minutes of the
Fourth Plenary Session, at 286, 288, U.N. Doc. 24, P/8 (Apr. 29, 1945) [hereinafter
Verbatim Minutes] (citing comments by John Sofianopoulos, Chairman of the Del-
egation of Greece).
115 See id.
116 See KOLB, supra note 60, at 82–83 (noting the text of Article 41 provides for
the “interruption of communication of all types with the sanctioned State”) (em-
phasis added).
117 Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection,
and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1188 n.137 (2011).
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tion.118 Thus, even taking the interruption at face value, it would
be difficult to find a form of electromagnetic communication
that at some point does not cross State boundaries.119
In the 1970s, the United States held that Article 41 of the
U.N. Charter can be construed broadly.120 During the Iran hos-
tage crisis, the acting U.S. Attorney General determined that
[t]he range of measures appears to be quite broad. . . . Article 41
can be construed to include an international news embargo: a
complete or selective restriction of news transmitted—either di-
rectly or indirectly. . . . It would at the very least include severance
of the means of transmission that link the embargoed country with
the outside world, e.g., microwave transmission links.121
The acting Attorney General also surmised that the U.S. Presi-
dent might possess the authority to sever communication links
without a Security Council resolution unilaterally.122 In 1979, in-
terference by cyber means was not a widely known capability,
but the United States’ initial position appears to be that electro-
magnetic interference (i.e., cyber means) falls under Article
41.123
B. EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH REJECTION OF THE U.N. CHARTER
The Tallinn Manual initially appears to agree with the ordi-
nary approach to communication and interruption under Arti-
cle 41 of the U.N. Charter in Rule 76, which is in the context of
a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.124
Likewise, interruption is generally given its ordinary meaning
118 See Housen-Couriel, supra note 41, at 432, 436, 442. There is also a general
wariness to treat cyber activities that involve cross-border intrusions too broadly as
a violation of sovereignty. Beatrice A. Walton, Note, Duties Owed: Low-Intensity
Cyber Attacks and Liability for Transboundary Torts in International Law, 126 YALE L.J.
1460, 1476–77 (2017).
119 See Housen-Couriel, supra note 41, at 432, 436, 442.
120 See The President’s Auth. to Take Certain Actions Relating to Commc’ns
from Iran, 4A Op. O.L.C. 153, 153 (1980), https://www.justice.gov/file/22336/
download [https://perma.cc/88NL-9ZBM].
121 Id. at 153–54 (emphasis added).
122 See id. at 154.
123 See id. at 153–54.
124 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 357–58 (stating that under Rule
76, the U.N. Security Council may authorize non-forceful measures including
cyber operations). For “communication,” the Tallinn Manual states that under
Article 41, “the Security Council may decide upon a complete or partial interrup-
tion of cyber communications with a State or non-State actor.” Id. at 358.
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for most effects-based approaches.125 Thus, the effects-based ap-
proach initially appears to endorse Article 41.126
However, the effects-based approach finds itself too wedded
to the consequence of cyber operations. Michael Schmitt added
the additional qualifier that the U.N. Security Council is limited
under Article 41 in that “physical harm to persons or objects
could not be authorized pursuant to Article 41.”127 In Schmitt’s
analysis, there is no citation to other parts of the U.N. Charter
or the travaux préparatoires indicating why the U.N. Security
Council should include a qualifier of physical harm to persons
or objects.128 The effects-based approach would state that under
Article 2(4) “force” must denote violence, but the means that
bring about the violence—whether kinetic or electronic—does
not matter.129 Yoram Dinstein also advocates that the means of
attack do not matter, but the violent consequences do.130
Other effects-based supporters have also come to this conclu-
sion for satellite interference. One supporter draws this conclu-
sion “because drafters of the Charter never contemplated
satellite signal interference would be used to cause physical
damage and human injury.”131 The main argument appears to
be an attack on U.N. Charter drafters themselves. Specifically,
according to Schmitt, the drafters “took a cognitive shortcut by
framing the treaty’s prohibition in terms of the instrument of co-
ercion employed—force.”132 However, there are major concerns
with Schmitt’s arguments. Namely, that
[i]t is also possible . . . to view the word “force” as conveying what
appears to be its plain meaning in the text: physical armed force
. . . . [I]t is a cognitive transcription of the desire of states to limit
the most serious prohibitions and penalties of the U.N. Charter
to the instrument whose misuse gave rise to the U.N. Charter
regime . . . .133
125 See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 584. Schmitt states that interruption of cyber
communication is included, stating, “An interruption could be broad in scope, as
in blocking cyber traffic to or from a country, or surgical, as in denying a particu-
lar group access to the Internet.” Id.
126 See generally id.
127 Id.
128 See id.
129 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 88 (5th ed. 2011).
130 See Dinstein, supra note 9, at 103.
131 Mountin, supra note 35, at 192.
132 Schmitt, supra note 4, at 573.
133 See Beard, supra note 20, at 118 (citing D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1958) (“Taking the words in their plain, common-sense
meaning, it is clear that, since the prohibition is of the ‘use or threat of force[,]’
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If the terms “communication” and “interruption” are to be
given their ordinary meaning, then the term “force” should like-
wise be given its ordinary meaning using the established modes
of treaty interpretation.134
Another effects-based argument is that approaches to the pro-
hibition of force based on the type of instrument are outdated
in modern warfare. The argument states that warfare and the
meaning of “force” have evolved because historic interpretations
leave the world “ossified at the level of military technology that
existed at the end of World War II.”135 Some have even stated
that all non-physical forces, such as electronic jamming and
cyberspace, should be differently analyzed because they did not
exist at the U.N. Charter’s drafting.136
It is historically disingenuous to assume the U.N. Charter
drafters were unaware of the results of interference, including
in the physical world. Jamming during peacetime occurred as
early as the 1930s, with Austria jamming Nazi broadcasts, Ger-
many and Russia jamming each other, and Italy jamming Soviet
broadcasts.137 When the U.N. Charter was drafted, the Interna-
tional Telegraph Union was reformed into the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) to deal with the effects of
harmful interference.138 ITU’s first order of business was to con-
demn jamming, which it did in every resolution from 1947
onward.139
There are historical examples of interference along the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum in wartime, indicating this technology was
well-known. The Army Signal Corps was formed in 1860, and the
management of the telegraph became its responsibility.140 By
World War I, jamming enemy signals had become routine for
communication lines,141 and by World War II, jamming in-
they will not apply to economic or political pressure but only to physical, armed
force.”)).
134 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 12, art. 31, ¶ 1.
135 Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 73, 84 (2002).
136 See Li, supra note 4, at 187–88.
137 See BERG, supra note 13, at 44.
138 See id. at 39.
139 See Penney, supra note 40, at 723–24.
140 See REBECCA ROBBINS RAINES, GETTING THE MESSAGE THROUGH: A BRANCH
HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY SIGNAL CORPS 7, 9 (1996), https://history.army.mil/
html/books/030/30-17-1/CMH_Pub_30-17-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM7D-
SEDP].
141 See id. at 263.
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cluded radio and radar navigational aids for aircraft and sea-
craft.142 This substantial, historical evidence demonstrates that
interference along the electromagnetic spectrum was well-
known during the U.N. Charter’s formation.
In World War II, the Germans employed the Fritz X, also
known as the Ruhrstahl X-1.143 The precision-guided, armor-
piercing bomb utilized against Allied ships used a radio com-
mand missile system, which demonstrated the ability to affect
the physical world in person-to-person contact and in person-to-
machine control.144 The Allies were able to develop various elec-
tronic countermeasures to interfere with the Fritz X.145 Fritz X
radio pulses and the countermeasures to prevent physical de-
struction demonstrate that the use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum to alter the physical world existed before the U.N.
Charter’s initial drafting.146
Besides historical examples, the provisions on the use of force
make little sense if they are not considered in the framework of
the U.N. Charter and its organization.147 The U.N. Charter’s
purpose of being the preeminent international document on jus
ad bellum analyses would capture all existing forms of warfare
and those short of warfare, including electromagnetic spectrum
interference.
C. TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF ARTICLE 41
Other portions of the U.N. Charter’s drafting history demon-
strate that interference by cyber means likely does not rise to the
level of a use of force. At Dumbarton Oaks, the Soviets argued
for the Security Council to have measures that were “short of
142 See GEORGE RAYNOR THOMPSON & DIXIE R. HARRIS, THE SIGNAL CORPS: THE
OUTCOME (MID-1943 THROUGH 1945) 89 (1966). The U.S. Army continued to be
the leader in electromagnetic interference through the 1990s with U.S. Air Force
Signals Intelligence “at the leading edge on cybersecurity.” See CLARKE & KNAKE,
supra note 5, at 102.




145 See id.; see also Thompson & Harris, supra note 142, at 301 (“[W]hen radar
pulses burst into the realms of radio and when inhuman radio-guided missiles
put in their terrifying appearance, the electromagnetic frequencies employed by
the new military engines became suddenly too dangerous to neglect. The spec-
trum itself became a weapon that could be deadly.”).
146 See generally KOLB, supra note 60, at 20 (noting the historical gatherings lead-
ing up to the United Nations’ establishment).
147 See CONFORTI & FOCARELLI, supra note 98, at 14.
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armed force,” which member States could then use in the event
of a threatening situation.148 The proposed measures included
total or partial interruption of postal, telegraphic, radiotele-
graphic (i.e., radio broadcasts), and other communications, and
later became Article 41 of the U.N. Charter.149
At the San Francisco conference, members clarified that the
most critical aspect of the draft proposals for Article 41 from
Dumbarton Oaks was that they did not involve force.150 Members
pointed out that Article 41 itself and interruption of communi-
cation did not amount to a use of force or military actions.151
148 See RUSSELL, supra note 112, at 466.
149 Observations of the Government of Venezuela, supra note 113, at 211.
150 See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at
624 (“The most important limitation on Art. 41 is that it may not involve the use
of armed force. The application of armed force is regulated in Art. 42 . . . .”).
Article 41 may in fact be the best example of what is not a use of force because it
is a non-exhaustive list. The full Soviet list included:
(a) appeal by the Council to the parties to settle things peacefully;
(b) a similar appeal warning of possible use of other measures; (c)
economic pressure on the parties to a dispute; (d) severance of dip-
lomatic relations; (e) severance of economic relations, including
interruption of transportation and communications; (f) provision,
by states “not possessing sufficient armed forces,” of territory for
bases; (g) sea and land blockade; (h) naval and air demonstrations;
(i) air raids on military objectives in an aggressor country; and (j)
military operations by member states against an aggressor.
See RUSSELL, supra note 112, at 466 n.56.
151 See U.N. Conference on International Organization, Replacement for Pages
19–21 of Skeleton Charter – Second Draft, at 531, U.N. Doc. WD 161, CO/78(1)
(June 4, 1945) (Article 45, which eventually became Article 41, was labeled “Non-
Military Sanctions”); Verbatim Minutes, supra note 114, at 288 (“[T]he Council
should be empowered to determine what measures could be employed . . . .
Those measures could range from the interruption of means of communication or the
mere severance of diplomatic relations to the application of sanctions by armed
force.”) (emphasis added). In discussing Article 47x (now Article 44), Mr. Rob-
ertson (the Canadian representative) asked “whether the expression ‘to use
force’ appears anywhere else in the Charter. The usual formula is to say ‘take
action under some articles.’” U.N. Conference on International Organization,
Summary Report of Fourteenth Meeting of Coordinate Committee, at 81, Doc. WD 288,
CO/116 (June 13, 1945). Chairman Mr. Pasovlsky—the U.S. representative who
was present at Dumbarton Oaks and is considered the primary author of the UN
Charter—referred to Article 45 (now Article 41) “which speaks of ‘measures not
involving the use of armed force.’” Id. One could, after reading the travaux
préparatoires for Article 41, improperly conclude that a State’s military could not
be involved in interruption of radio, telegraphic, or other forms of communica-
tion through the use of the phrase “nonmilitary.” See RUSSELL, supra note 112, at
466 (referring to the measures as “nonmilitary”). However, Article 41-type mea-
sures can be enforced with the use of a State’s military based on previous ICJ
opinions and a long history of State practice. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
2021] RETHINKING CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 243
The ICJ reinforced this view in the Tadić decision when it found
that the ordinary meaning of Article 41 did not involve the use
of force.152
Additionally, Article 41 is the best example of what is not a use
of force. When the Soviets proposed a full list of measures at
Dumbarton Oaks,153 the U.K. and U.S. initially opposed the
list.154 However, the British and Americans finally relented by
ensuring that Article 41 was worded in permissive terms to indi-
cate a non-exhaustive list.155 By the San Francisco conference,
the list’s non-exhaustive nature seemed to be a settled matter
since the debate centered on making sure the option for “par-
tial” or “complete” interruption only related to communication
and not diplomatic encounters.156
Decades later, in the Tadić decision, the ICJ clarified that Arti-
cle 41 is a non-exhaustive list, specifically stating that Article 41
could include actions such as creating an international tribu-
nal.157 Thus, even if one argues cyberspace did not exist at the
U.N. Charter’s inception and could not have fallen under the
Article 41 framework,158 the non-exhaustive nature demon-
strates that all communication interruptions are similar and do
not involve a use of force.159 The phrase “other communica-
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 34 (Nov. 6) (strongly reaffirming the distinction
made by the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua).
152 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995)
(“The Article, on its face, does not limit the discretion of the Security Council to
take measures not involving the use of armed force.”).
153 See RUSSELL, supra note 112, at 466 n.56.
154 See id. at 466.
155 See id.
156 U.N. Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Twenty-
Third Meeting of Coordination Committee, at 152–53, Doc. WD 442, CO/206 (Sept. 5,
1945) (“[T]he article had been slightly revised so that the words ‘partial or com-
plete’ would apply to the interruption of communication channels and not to the severance
of diplomatic relations.”) (emphasis added).
157 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 26–29 (“Chapter VII confers very wide powers upon the Security Council and
no good reason has been advanced why Article 41 should be read as excluding
the step, very appropriate in the circumstances, of creating the International Tri-
bunal to deal with the notorious situation existing in the former Yugoslavia.”).
158 Schmitt, supra note 4, at 572.
159 Jann K. Kleffner & Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, Keeping the Cyber Peace: In-
ternational Legal Aspects of Cyber Activities in Peace Operations, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 512,
516 (2013) (“Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may also man-
date non-forceful measures be taken in situations it deems to be a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such enforcement measures may
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tions” encompasses cyberspace because actions in cyberspace
are communicative tools by their very nature.160
There are recent indications that military actions in cyber-
space, like other forms of communication interruption, do not
rise to the level of a use of force.161 For example, in its 2018
Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, the DoD stated that the U.S.
military would “defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious
cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the
level of armed conflict.”162 Likewise, Russia, China, and North
Korea are using their militaries to operate in cyberspace outside
of armed conflict with various actions, including espionage and
interference by cyber means.163
D. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF JAMMING
The leading interpretation is that Article 2(4) covers “armed
coercion” and does not extend in scope to political or economic
coercion.164 There can be severe impacts under Article 41 that
can even lead to death, but that does not mean they rise to the
level of a use of force.165 Marco Roscini stated that “economic
sanctions that cause starvation among the population are not a
use of armed force” and “sanctions may be enforced with the
use of weapons, but are not weapons themselves, as implied in
Article 41 of the UN Charter.”166 Likewise, cyber operations may
have severe effects, but it is not the effects or second-order con-
sequences that make a cyber operation a use of force.167
include, inter alia, partial or total disruption of telecommunications which may well con-
tain a cyber element.”) (emphasis added).
160 See U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, supra note 17, at 215
(“[E]lectronic manipulation” includes jamming of “different types of electronic
interference or signals that flood communications channels.”).
161 See Gervais, supra note 80, at 535 (“[C]yber espionage and exploitation fails
to rise to the level of warfare because the purpose or outcome of both cyber
espionage and exploitation is to monitor information and not to affect a com-
puter system’s functionality.”); see also Beard, supra note 20, at 139 (asserting that
states have resisted treating cyber espionage, sabotage, and subversion as
“cyberwar”).
162 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 1
(2018) https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/
CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/3GLZ-AFHX].
163 See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 5, at 18–19 (referring to Russia’s NotPetya
operation as an “operation run by a military unit”).
164 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 103, at 911–12.
165 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 49.
166 Id.
167 See Schmitt, supra note 103, at 912–13.
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State practice has demonstrated that “economic” coercion is
not considered a use of force in communication interruptions;
thus, creating implications for cyberspace. For example, multi-
ple jamming efforts of satellites have carried television broad-
casts throughout the Middle East.168 A primary culprit is Iran,
having jammed BBC Persia television in 2009 and 2010;169 the
Eutelsat satellite constellation for about a decade in the
2010s;170 and the United States broadcasts to its region in
2012.171
Iranian jamming demonstrates that the interruption of televi-
sion broadcast communications falls below a use of force. The
complaint was not brought to the U.N. Security Council’s atten-
tion but to the ITU’s.172 In other words, instead of a U.N.
body—which handles threats to peace and security—the ITU
dealt with the Eutelsat complaints.173
A few States have made public statements that cyber opera-
tions causing severe financial impact may violate the non-inter-
vention principle, which falls short of classifying cyber
operations as a use of force.174 Thus, States’ public statements
and the considerable economic losses caused by jamming both
call into question the premise of the effects-based analysis.175
168 See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
169 See Anne Wainscott-Sargent, Fighting Satellite Interference on All Fronts, VIA SAT-
ELLITE (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.satellitetoday.com/uncategorized/2013/03/
01/fighting-satellite-interference-on-all-fronts/ [https://perma.cc/RN3H-
NZ8B].
170 See Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Tells Iran to End Eutelsat Satellite Jamming,
REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-jamming-itu/u-n-tells-iran-to-
end-eutelsat-satellite-jamming-idUSTRE62P21G20100326 [https://perma.cc/
T6LN-NYHX] (Mar. 26, 2010, 6:23 AM); see also SMALL MEDIA, SATELLITE JAMMING
IN IRAN: A WAR OVER AIRWAYS (2012), https://smallmedia.org.uk/media/
projects/files/satjam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJ6-N7U2].
171 Tehran Jamming Foreign Broadcasts, RADIO FREE EUROPE: RADIO LIBERTY (Oct.
4, 2012, 8:42 AM), https://www.rferl.org/a/tehran-jamming-foreign-broadcasts/
24728694.html [https://perma.cc/EVL9-G8FJ].
172 Sonne & Fassihi, supra note 16.
173 Id. The ITU spokesperson stated that “[i]n this case there is evidence that
there is a deliberate attempt to block the satellite transmissions” and that Iran
should “‘eliminate it as a matter of highest priority.’” See Nebehay, supra note
170.
174 See Ney Remarks, supra note 87.
175 The Director of Public Affairs at the Broadcasting Board of Governors
stated in response to the Iranian jamming that “[w]hen you consider the time
spent on finding other options, contacting audiences and affiliates, the potential
loss of audiences not just in Iran, but other markets that depend on those satel-
lites for content from VOA and other BBG networks, the costs are considerable.”
SMALL MEDIA, supra note 170. Simply because economic consequences could be
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Schmitt attempts to parse out these economic and diplomatic
measures in his effects-based model through a seven-factor anal-
ysis.176 He does this primarily through the “invasiveness” fac-
tor.177 However, economic coercion is part and parcel with the
same actions in both cyberspace and jamming.178 The complica-
tion with Schmitt’s approach is that the effects caused by cyber-
space and those caused by economic sanctions seem arbitrary.
By “extending its principles outside the regime of cyber weap-
ons [Schmitt] introduces measures of coercion not traditionally
included in the prohibition on force, such as economic, diplo-
matic, or ideological coercion.”179 It unnecessarily reignites a de-
bate that economic coercion should be treated as a use of force,
which has chiefly been settled by State practice.180
Additionally, the United States has held that Article 41-type
actions by the Security Council or the United States are not a
use of force.181 Thus, despite potentially severe effects and eco-
nomic impact, neither economic sanctions nor interference by
cyber means are considered a use of force.182
E. SECURITY COUNCIL’S IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 41
The U.N. Security Council has implemented Article 41 several
times for partial or complete interruptions for postal, tele-
graphic, radio, or other means of communications. The imple-
severe, the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force does not cover economic
coercion. See Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting, supra note 78, at 334–35; Proposal
Presented by the Brazilian Delegation, supra note 78; see also Gervais, supra note 80, at
536–37.
176 Schmitt, supra note 103, at 914–15, 915 n.81.
177 Id. at 914 (“In armed coercion, the act causing the harm usually crosses
into the target state, whereas in economic warfare the acts generally occur be-
yond the target’s borders. As a result, even though armed and economic acts may
have roughly similar consequences, the former represents a greater intrusion on
the rights of the target state . . . .”).
178 See Beard, supra note 20, at 117–118 (“[E]fforts by a few states to explicitly
include one important type of destructive, nonphysical conduct in the Article
2(4) prohibition against force—acts of economic coercion—were rejected.”).
179 Gervais, supra note 80, at 540.
180 This becomes particularly perplexing since a substantial portion of cyber
operations are not militaristic in nature, but “take the form of espionage, crime,
or political or economic coercion.” See Patterson, supra note 63, at 975.
181 The President’s Auth. to Take Certain Actions Relating to Commc’ns from
Iran, 4A Op. O.L.C. 153, 153–54.
182 See ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 49 (“[E]conomic sanctions that cause starvation
among the population are not a use of armed force in spite of their severe hu-
manitarian consequences: sanctions may be enforced with the use of weapons,
but are not weapons themselves, as implied in Article 41 of the UN Charter.”).
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mentation of Article 41 by the U.N. Security Council indicates
that measures under it do not rise to the level of a use of force.
Article 41 has become a common tool for peace maintenance,
and the Security Council has imposed it more than twenty times
since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.183 Specifically, the Se-
curity Council uses Article 41 when it wants to signal it is not
using force.184 The Security Council has even become creative
and utilized Article 41 to establish other non-forceful measures,
such as establishing international criminal tribunals.185
In 1966, the Security Council implemented Article 41 for the
first time in Southern Rhodesia, which was also the first time
there were recommendations for communication interrup-
tions.186 At first, the Security Council proposed implementing
all sanctions under Article 41 to ensure practical application of
the Security Council decision.187 However, the full range of mea-
183 See 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1308 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
184 See id. at 1311 (“The range of measures available under Art. 41 is very
broad, but it explicitly excludes action involving the use of force. The SC has thus used
references to Art. 41 to stress that it did not intend to authorize forcible action. ‘Use of force’
in this context should be interpreted widely to include, for example, naval demonstrations
and blockades.”) (emphasis added).
185 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence Motion
on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 26–29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10,
1995).
186 U.N. Sec. Council, Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression, in REPERTOIRE OF SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE, ARTI-
CLE 41 MEASURES – MEASURES NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE, 1966-
1968, at 208, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/ac-
tions#rel3 (choose “1966–1968”) [https://perma.cc/5C2J-K45Q] [hereinafter
1966–1968 SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE].
187 At the 1259th meeting of the Securtiy Council, on November 13, 1965, the
representative of the United Kingdom introduced a draft resolution which called
upon all Members of the United Nations to endorse and support the economic
sanctions which the United Kingdom was about to apply on the “illegal and un-
constitutional regime in Southern Rhodesia” following its declaration of inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom—including an embargo on supplies of oil
and petroleum products, and of rail, sea, air, postal telegraphic, radio and other
means of communication and severance of diplomatic and consular relations—in
accordance with Article 41 of the Charter. U.N. Sec. Council, Actions with Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, in REPERTOIRE OF
SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE, ARTICLE 41 MEASURES – MEASURES NOT INVOLVING
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE, 1964–1965, at 191, https://www.un.org/securi-
tycouncil/content/repertoire/actions#rel3 (choose “1964–1965”) [https://
perma.cc/X8P3-Y5CM] [hereinafter 1964–1965 SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE];
S.C. Res. 253 (May 29, 1968). By March 19, 1968, initial discussions indicated that
the sanctions must be total, and all Members of the United Nations “must be
asked to implement all the measures provided for in Article 41, including the
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sures was not initially implemented, leaving communication un-
interrupted.188 By 1970, the Security Council passed further
Article 41 measures but did not call explicitly for the complete
interruption of communications.189 Nonetheless, the Australian
Postmaster General shut down all postal and telecommunica-
tion services for the Rhodesian Information Centre under the
auspices of Article 41 measures.190
interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of com-
munications, including also information media such as the press, films and televi-
sion programmes.” 1966–1968 SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE, supra note 186, at
208.
188 At the 1533rd meeting of the Securtiy Council, on March 13, 1970, the
representative of the United States called for a “speedy and unanimous decision
to deny recognition to” Southern Rhodesia, but he explained that
His delegation was . . . opposed to imposing a communication ban,
not only because of the traditional attachment of the United States
to freedom of movement and speech, but also because it believed
that cutting off communication and free flow of information would
not contribute to a solution of the problem, but rather tend to
harden further the attitude of the white minority [in Southern
Rhodesia].
U.N. Sec. Council, Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression, in REPERTOIRE OF SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE, ARTICLE 41
MEASURES – MEASURES NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE, 1969–1971, at
202, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/actions#rel3
(choose “1969–1971”) [https://perma.cc/URB9-S8UJ] [hereinafter 1969–1971
SECURITY COUNCIL PRACTICE]. The draft resolution that included the interruption
of communication failed. Id. The Security Council was likely implementing Arti-
cle 42 by permitting an oil embargo to and from Southern Rhodesia, but it was
not explicit in doing so. See S.C. Res. 221 (Apr. 9, 1966). The United Kingdom
was expressly authorized to arrest and detain tankers exporting oil and could use
military force, so it is assumed that this is a use of armed force; thus, the Security
Council was authorizing actions under Article 42 with regard to the oil embargo.
See id. ¶ 5; see also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra
note 12, at 624–25.
189 S.C. Res. 277 (Mar. 18, 1970). Resolution 277 of the U.N. Security Council
called on all member states to take further measures under Article 41, including
the interruption of transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia, and re-
quested all member states take all possible further action under Article 41 in
order “to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia.” Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 11. Resolu-
tion 277 (and the previous resolution regarding Southern Rhodesia, Security
Council resolution 253) did not explicitly mention the interruption of communi-
cation, but the Security Council’s measures implemented under Article 41
against Southern Rhodesia included the interruption of telephone communica-
tions of the Rhodesian Information Centre, causing Australian domestic courts to
debate whether Security Council decisions could take effect in Australia without
further legislation. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 12, at 626, ¶ 14.
190 52 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 1–2 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1979). “In
April 1973, the Australian Postmaster General directed that all postal and tele-
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If these interruptions of communications between Australia
and South Rhodesia were permissible under Article 41 as mea-
sures that did not rise to the level of a use of force, similar com-
munication interruptions could be unilaterally used by a State
without rising to the level of a use of force. A State could cut off
all e-mail, cut off all other forms of telecommunications, and
shut down internet service between two countries, and none of
these would be considered a use of force.191
Since the Cold War ended, the Security Council’s implemen-
tation of Article 41 has become more common.192 In 2004, the
Security Council demanded Côte d’Ivoire authorities “stop all
radio and television broadcasting inciting hatred, intolerance
and violence.”193 In 2011, Resolution 1967 dealt with a situation
in Côte d’Ivoire in which the local media, Radiodiffusion Télévi-
sion Ivoirienne (RTI), continued to incite violence.194 The reso-
lution called for the partial interruption of all media
communication to propagate false information and incite ha-
tred, specifically naming RTI.195 Such Security Council Article
41 actions indicate communication interruptions are not a use
of force.196
communication services for the Rhodesian Information Centre be withdrawn
forthwith. This direction was made with a view to implementing Resolutions of
the Security Council of the United Nations and in particular the Resolution of 18
March 1970.” Id. Specifically, the Postmaster General’s Department disconnected
their telephone, changed the post office box lock, and stopped mail and tele-
grams. Id.
191 In contrast, the South Rhodesian situation demonstrates that Article 42
measures involve the use of force. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 624–25. The Article 42 measures involving the use
of force cover more traditional physical acts, such as direct invasion or naval
blockade. See U.N. Charter art. 42.
192 CONFORTI & FOCARELLI, supra note 98, at 237 (“Sanctions [under Article 41]
have been adopted and renewed many times . . . [since the end of the Cold War,]
against Iraq since 1990, the former Yugoslavia since 1991, Somalia since 1992,
Liberia since 1992, Haiti since 1993, Angola since 1993, Rwanda since 1994, Su-
dan since 1996, Sierra Leone since 1997, Afghanistan [and non-State actor Al
Qaeda] since 1999, Ethiopia and Eritrea since 2000, the Democratic Republic of
Congo since 2003, the Ivory Coast since 2004, Lebanon since 2006, [North] Ko-
rea since 2006 and Iran since 2006 . . . .”).
193 S.C. Res. 1572, ¶ 6 (Nov. 15, 2004).
194 See S.C. Res. 1967, ¶ 10 (Jan. 19, 2011).
195 This was only a partial interruption of communications because the resolu-
tion permitted other media without prejudice. Id.
196 The Security Council also clarified its decision not to interrupt communica-
tion in certain resolutions. In 1993, during the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia,
the Security Council passed a resolution imposing sanctions on financial and
non-financial institutions with an exception for telecommunications and postal
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When the Security Council and States speak or implement
communication interruptions, they generally do not cite the ter-
minology of using force or armed attack. Thus, actions under
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter are measures that do not rise to
the level of a use of force, and all interference along the electro-
magnetic spectrum—including interference by cyber means—is
likely not a use of force either.
IV. ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE: WIDESPREAD
AND SYSTEMATIC STATE PRACTICE DURING
NON-HOSTILITIES
A. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter demonstrates that under a jus
ad bellum analysis, it is improbable that cyber interference will
rise to the level of a use of force. Besides treaty analysis, custom-
ary international law is the other primary method of analysis.197
Generally, State practice has not treated any stand-alone cyber
operations by States as armed attacks or a use of force, which
demonstrated that customary international law cuts against the
effects-based approach in cyberspace.198
services. See S.C. Res. 820, ¶¶ 21, 27 (Apr. 17, 1993). The decision to not inter-
rupt telecommunications was later changed during the NATO campaign in the
former Yugoslavia when actual airstrikes (as opposed to jamming) targeted TV
broadcast transmitters. See Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Re-
port to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bomb-
ing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶¶ 71–73 (June 8,
2000), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HY69-VVL9]. The justification given was that “[s]trikes against TV transmitters
and broadcast facilities [were] part of [NATO’s] campaign to dismantle the FRY
propaganda machinery which [was] a vital part of President Milosevic’s control
mechanism.” Id. ¶ 74; see also Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia, Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, U.N. Press Release
PR/P.I.S./510-e (June 13, 2000), https://www.icty.org/en/press/prosecutors-re-
port-nato-bombing-campaign [https://perma.cc/959Q-8M98] (involving an ex-
ample of an interruption of communications during wartime which was analyzed
under a different legal standard than the jus ad bellum analysis).
197 The International Court of Justice adopted this framework for interpreting
international law in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, recognizing international
conventions, custom, and the general principles of law of recognized civilized
nations as the building blocks for international law interpretation. See ICJ Statute,
supra note 53, art. 38, ¶ 1. As stated previously, existing jus ad bellum rules involv-
ing use of force, like treaties and customary international law, extend to cyber. See
ROSCINI, supra note 2, at 25.
198 See Beard, supra note 20, at 78–79 (“[T]he continuing failure of states to
treat damaging cyber acts standing alone as armed attacks is highly significant
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Historic State practice is the best way to determine customary
international law.199 According to the ICJ, State practice must be
“extensive and virtually uniform” to be considered customary in-
ternational law, which is a historical analysis.200 However, the ef-
fects-based model makes arguments based on potential
prospective State behavior.201 Much of the effects-based analysis is
speculative, finding that “the consequences suffered [is what] mat-
ter[s] to states” and thus rejects not only the U.N. Charter’s
framework but also the traditional, historical analytical
framework.202
The ordinary meaning of the U.N. Charter’s text can only be
rejected when it is clearly contrary to customary international
law because of the U.N. Charter’s long-standing history of defin-
ing jus ad bellum.203 Thus, the effects-based approach to interfer-
ence by cyber means would have to be found in a primary
since the establishment of customary international law is dependent on the find-
ing of such state practice . . . .”).
199 See ICJ Statute, supra note 53, art. 38, ¶ 1(b) (defining customary law as
“general practice accepted as law”); see also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 55, at 25–26 (“However, the formulation in the Statute serves to em-
phasise that the substance of this source of international law is to be found in the
practice of states.”). Customary international law is different from usage because
of the binding nature of custom versus the mere habit found in usage. Id. at 27.
200 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20).
201 The effects-based analysis uses seven criteria of what can be classified as a
use of force in cyberspace. See Schmitt, supra note 4, 576–77. According to
Schmitt,
The criteria are admittedly imprecise, thereby permitting states sig-
nificant latitude in characterizing a cyber operation as a use of
force, or not. . . . [A] tendency towards resolving grey areas in favor
of finding a use of force can be expected to emerge. This State practice
will over time clarify the norm and its attendant threshold.
Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
202 Id. at 573. The International Court of Justice identified the two components
that are required to establish customary international law in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf case in the absence of a treaty obligation. See North Sea Continental
Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43–44, ¶ 76–77. First, there must be acts by the states con-
cerned that “amount to a settled practice.” Id. at 44, ¶ 77. Second, such settled
practice must also be “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obliga-
tory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.” Id. Regarding the law of armed
conflict, the United States has endorsed the view that states are bound to follow
all treaties they are party to and all applicable customary international law. See
U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS § 5.1.2.1 (2007).
203 See, e.g., U.N. charter arts. 2, ¶ 4, 41, 42, 51; see also ICJ Statute, supra note
53, art. 38, ¶ 1.
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obligation that would potentially constitute a rule of law.204 Ad-
ditionally, the ordinary meaning of Article 41 of the U.N. Char-
ter for communication interruptions could only be rejected if
there is extensive and virtually uniform behavior to demonstrate
that electromagnetic interference is a use of force.205 Yet, there
is a lack of evidence in customary international law of reframing
jus ad bellum to cyberspace based on an effects-based
approach.206
B. WIDESPREAD SYSTEMATIC STATE PRACTICE
There appear to be widespread and systematic instances of
jamming in the international context. In recent years, there
have been dozens of known instances of satellite transmission
interference during non-declared hostilities.207 These instances
include “Cuban disruption of Iranian broadcasts in 2009; . . .
Iranian disruption of Eutelsat transmissions since 2009, the sub-
ject of formal protest to the ITU; Brazilian hackers’ disruption
of US Navy FLTSAT-8 in 2010; Jordanian jamming of Al-Jazeera
transmissions in 2011; and China’s blocking of BBC transmis-
sion in 2012.”208
However, there are limitations to reviewing all State practices
of electromagnetic interference when analyzing jus ad bellum.
Verification of jamming can be difficult to attribute to one State
because of the operations’ covert nature and technical compli-
cations.209 Even if States suspect one another, there may be geo-
political reasons for not admitting one’s military equipment or
civilian targets are susceptible to jamming or other forms of
electromagnetic interference. This is not that different from
cyberspace, where attribution can be nearly impossible at
times.210 The examples of customary international law that fol-
low are based on available public information. Even with a lim-
ited vantage point, trends emerge on how States approach
jamming and other forms of interference during non-declared
hostilities.
204 See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 41–42, ¶ 72.
205 See id. ¶ 74.
206 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 1029 (“Unlike the expansion of criminal law to
include cybercrimes, however, the law of war has gone unchanged [in cyber].”).
207 See Housen-Couriel, supra note 41, at 440.
208 Id.
209 See generally ELECTRONIC WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 37, at 5-15, 6-
23, 9-6.
210 See Beard, supra note 20, at 77–79, 80–81.
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One of the most well-known jammed satellite constellations is
Eutelsat.211 Recently, the number of deliberate jamming events
has dramatically increased, going from fifty-four Eutelsat cases
in 2010 to 109 in 2011 and spiking to at least 340 in 2012.212 The
number of minutes of jamming is on the rise as well: In fact,
“[i]n June 2011, [Eutelsat] had 148 minutes of jamming. In
March 2012, it was 4,714 minutes. In May 2013, it had increased
to 46,000 minutes, and in August 2013 it reached 53,000
minutes.”213
These amounts are substantial for a company that is one of
the world’s largest satellite operators and ranked third in global
revenues for all customized communications.214 The size and
profitability of Eutelsat operations along with their close con-
nection to the European Union, have not prevented the com-
pany from being jammed.
Iran is the likely culprit of many of these interference inci-
dents (i.e., jamming), and some incidents have resulted in a for-
mal ITU protest.215 Yet, these interferences have not led to a
referral to the Security Council or a declaration by government
officials that Iran is engaged in an armed attack. Instead, the
interferences have been treated as a lower level of international
wrong through “naming and shaming.”216
211 Eutelsat began as a hybrid consortium of European Union governments
and the private sector in 1982. See HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 109 (Frans von der
Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds. 2015).
212 Sargent, supra note 169.
213 Peter B. de Selding, U.S. Halt to Jamming of Cuban Broadcasts Could Aid Inter-
national Efforts to Combat Interference, SPACENEWS (Oct. 9, 2014), https://
spacenews.com/42133us-halt-to-jamming-of-cuban-broadcasts-could-aid-interna-
tional/ [https://perma.cc/E22B-DBDD].
214 World Teleport Ass’n, Global 20 of 2020: Top Teleport Operators, https://
www.worldteleport.org/page/TopOps_2020_Global [https://perma.cc/86NP-
FG32]; see also HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 211, at 301. Eutelsat became
much more of a private company by 2005, offering 30 percent of its shares in an
Initial Public Offering, is one of the world’s largest satellite operators, and has
expanded to multi-media and the Internet. Id.
215 Sonne & Fassihi, supra note 16 (“Eutelsat says it has filed numerous com-
plaints with a U.N. agency that manages outer-space frequencies, the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, an arm of which stated in March that the
interference ‘appeared to be emanating from Iran.’”).
216 The ITU spokesperson took the unusual step of publically condemning
Iran stating that “[i]n this case there is evidence that there is a deliberate attempt
to block the satellite transmissions” and that Iran should “eliminate [the source
of interference] as a matter of highest priority.” Nebehay, supra note 170. How-
ever, there is no indication based on public information that much else hap-
pened to Iran.
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Other numbers of stand-alone jamming events during peace-
time indicate that the practice is widespread and systematic. A
February to November 2016 study found 9,833 instances of
GPS217 interference affecting 1,311 commercial vessels, with the
disruptions coming from “ten or more locations in Russia and
Russian-controlled areas.”218 At least 400 instances involved false
coordinates or denial-of-service outside of conflict zones in
places like St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Vladivostok.219 The scale
of jamming demonstrates that other countries besides Iran are
involved in widespread, systematic, GPS interference efforts dur-
ing non-declared hostilities.
North Korea is also involved in widespread jamming. Accord-
ing to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), North Korea
is involved in widespread intentional interference with GPS and
navigation communication networks, including the jamming of
U.S. aircraft and maritime vessels.220 In March and April 2016,
North Korea broadcasted a jamming signal on at least 100 occa-
sions, affecting 962 planes, nearly 700 fishing vessels, and many
cellphone base stations.221 Between 2010 and April 2016, North
Korea had engaged in at least four rounds of GPS jamming.222
217 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is the broader category of geo-
spatial timing services that includes the American NAVSTAR GPS system, the Rus-
sian GLONASS system, the European Galileo GNSS system, and the Chinese
Beidou (Compass) system. See HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 211, at 556.
For ease of understanding, “GNSS” jamming or interference will be referred to as
“GPS” through the remainder of this article.
218 C4ADS, ABOVE US ONLY STARS: EXPOSING GPS SPOOFING IN RUSSIA AND
SYRIA 15 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232
d5358a/t/5c99488beb39314c45e782da/1553549492554/Above+Us+Only
+Stars.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9VG-DGPZ] (“Using Automatic Identification Sys-
tem (AIS) ship location data collected at scale, C4ADS identified [the] . . . in-
stances” of interference that appear to have originated from Russia.). Some of
these events may be related to conflict zones near Ukraine and Syria. Id. at 13; see
also SECURE WORLD FOUND., GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES: AN OPEN
SOURCE ASSESSMENT 2-19 (Brian Weeden & Victoria Samson eds., 2020), https://
swfound.org/media/206970/swf_counterspace2020_electronic_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PXD-H45U].
219 C4ADS, supra note 218, at 15.
220 Amendment of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Pyongyang
Flight Information Region (FIR) (ZKKP), 83 Fed. Reg. 47,059, 47,061 (Sept. 18,
2018) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).




2021] RETHINKING CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 255
A large number of recent interference events demonstrate
that multiple countries engage in interruptions of communica-
tions systems. These events are just a snapshot during a short
period. Since States do not always admit when they are jammed,
jamming is likely more widespread and attribution is problem-
atic.223 Recent State practice indicates jamming does not rise to
a use of force because the events were neither referred to the
Security Council nor resulted in known Article 51 self-defense
measures.
C. BROADCAST JAMMING: EVERYONE’S DOING IT
Besides the number of recent incidents, there is a long history
of jamming. Some commentators argue that this electromag-
netic interference is a new form of warfare and can be classified
as a use of force.224 However, jamming during non-declared hos-
tilities has occurred for nearly ninety years.225 The systematic
and widespread use of jamming historically demonstrates that
communication interruption over the electromagnetic spectrum
likely does not amount to a use of force.
Jamming during peacetime occurred as early as the 1930s,
with Austria jamming Nazi broadcasts, Germany and Russia jam-
ming each other, and Italy jamming Soviet broadcasts.226 The
ICJ stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that whether a
custom has developed depends on if widespread and representa-
tive practice occurs, including by States that are specifically af-
fected.227 States have historically not treated stand-alone
223 See Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribu-
tion, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 229, 231, 233 (2012); see also DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA
GREGO & LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A REFERENCE MAN-
UAL 121–22 (2005) (explaining that it is difficult to locate an uplink jammer be-
cause they can operate from a large area); see also Mountin, supra note 35, at 121
(“Locating sources of interference and distinguishing a bona fide jamming attack
from other forms of communication degradations or disruptions caused by sys-
temic disturbances or natural phenomena like solar flares and astronomical
storms is also difficult.”).
224 Li, supra note 4, at 187–88 (“Rather than permitting law to become ‘ossified
at the level of technology that existed at the end of World War II[,]’ [the effects-
based analysis] adopts an evolving definition that permits non-physical force—
such as electronic jamming, directed-energy weapons, and cyber-attacks—to fall
under the umbrella of military force.”).
225 See BERG, supra note 13, at 44.
226 See id.
227 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 73 (Feb. 20) (“[B]efore a conventional rule can be considered to have
become a general rule of international law, it might be that, even without the
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jamming as an act of war. This may be because “[e]very country
in the world has engaged in this type of intentional military ra-
dio jamming and many, to varying degrees and with varying
methods, have engaged in jamming of foreign broadcasts to
protect themselves from foreign ideas thought to be counter to
established societal goals.”228 Widespread military jamming,
which has historically occurred and continues to occur during
peacetime, refutes the notion that this activity occurs only dur-
ing armed conflict.229 If every country in the world has partici-
pated in jamming during peacetime, then the custom has likely
developed that it is not a use of force.
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases also analyze the time ele-
ment of custom, which is helpful in determining if a custom has
developed in jamming under jus ad bellum. While short periods
can develop new customary international law, an “indispensable
requirement” is that the practice is “both extensive and virtually
uniform.”230
The Soviet Union’s jamming activities, which occurred during
the Cold War without open hostilities, illustrate the behavior of
one of the major international players at a critical time. “Never,
however, has the practice of jamming radio broadcast signals
during peacetime been as blatantly exhibited as it was by the
Soviet Union and its East European Satellites against Western
democracies.”231 The Soviets began jamming Voice of America
(VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and Radio
Free Europe in 1948 and continued until at least 1988.232 There
passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that
of States whose interests were specifically affected.”).
228 COLD WAR BROADCASTING: IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EU-
ROPE 52–53 (A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta eds., 2010) (emphasis added).
229 See id.
230 North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43, ¶ 74 (“Although the passage of
only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of
a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a
purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the
period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of
States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked.”).
231 COLD WAR BROADCASTING: IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EU-
ROPE, supra note 228, at 53.
232 See BERG, supra note 13, at 45–46. There would be periods in which the
jamming would stop or diminish at times. Id. For example, jamming stopped
briefly during 1963 and 1964 following the atomic test ban agreement. Id.
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was no public acknowledgment that Soviet jamming was a use of
force during these forty years.
The widespread and virtually uniform acceptance of jamming
during peacetime is not limited to the former Soviet Union.
China engaged in widespread jamming of VOA from 1956 to
1978.233 The jamming resumed in 2001 and included BBC and
several Tibet transmissions.234 Chinese jamming of BBC broad-
casts occurred as recently as 2013.235 In 2011, Ethiopian journal-
ists asked China to stop providing jamming equipment and
technology to the regime for jamming Ethiopian Satellite Televi-
sion inside Ethiopia; China’s motivation was likely to interfere
with anti-Chinese programming.236 Such a request demonstrates
that China does not view broadcast jamming as a use of force
because it has engaged in this behavior outside of an armed
conflict.
The United States and Cuba have also engaged in a series of
broadcast jamming events against each other.237 Cuba initially
engaged in some jamming around the Cuban missile crisis, but
the brunt of its jamming began in 1985 up through the mid-
2010s.238 The United States condemned the Cuban and Soviet
jamming of U.S. radio and television broadcasts as human rights
violations.239 However, the United States never claimed the jam-
ming efforts amounted to a use of force or an armed attack.240
This may be partly because the United States engaged in jam-
233 See id. at 46.
234 See id. at 46–47.
235 Radio Jamming—Not A Thing of The Past, ECONOMIST (Feb. 26, 2013, 7:08
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/radio-jamming—not-a-thing-of-the-past-
2013-2 [https://perma.cc/XKC8-6WRP] (“Amid all the fevered talk and high-
tech details surrounding the ‘cyber cold war’ that China seems to be waging—
and perhaps winning—against America and many other nations, there is some-
thing refreshingly nostalgic about new accusations that China is, in the high style
of the actual cold war, jamming the BBC’s shortwave radio broadcasts.”).
236 EFJA Urges China To Stop Complicity in Jamming Ethiopian Satellite TV Transmis-
sions, ETHIOPIAN FREE PRESS JOURNALISTS ASS’N (June 22, 2011), https://ifex.org/
efja-urges-china-to-stop-complicity-in-jamming-ethiopian-satellite-tv-transmis
sions/ [https://perma.cc/X37W-PNU2].
237 de Selding, supra note 213.
238 See id.; BERG, supra note 13, at 47.
239 See Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio
Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 628, 628–29, 645–46 (1997).
240 See id. at 628–29. The United States viewed interference with these transmis-
sions as a breach of international law in violation of the right to free expression.
Id. The Soviets’ and the Cubans’ view was that “state sovereignty precluded such
undesirable foreign transmissions, and jamming was a legitimate and often-used
countermeasure.” Id. at 629.
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ming of Cuban broadcasts for decades.241 The U.S. jamming of
Cuban broadcasts only became widespread knowledge when the
United States announced it would stop the practice in 2014.242
Democracies other than the United States have also jammed
broadcast signals. South Korea jammed North Korean television
broadcasts from 1945 to 1999 under special security law.243 In
2012, Iran claimed that the U.K. was jamming Iranian broad-
casts on Eutelsat’s Hotbird satellite network, possibly as retalia-
tion for Iran jamming Eutelsat broadcasts in 2009.244 Such
examples indicate that peacetime broadcast jamming extends
even to democracies.
The list of countries engaged in broadcast jamming in recent
history is extensive. Egypt claims their jamming of Israeli
cellphones was accidental and that the real target of its jamming
efforts in 2018 was Sinai jihadis loyal to the Islamic State; yet,
outages in Israel and the Gaza strip still occurred.245 Addition-
ally, the Qatar-based news agency, Al Jazeera, claimed the Egyp-
tian military jammed its satellite broadcasts in 2013.246 Finally,
Vietnam, North Korea, Iran, Chile, and Zimbabwe have all en-
gaged in jamming broadcasts during peacetime.247 From a statis-
tical standpoint, satellite jamming incidents rose from 5% in
2010 to 15% in 2013.248
However, nothing states that broadcast jamming is not an in-
ternational wrong. The ITU has labeled “harmful interference”
241 de Selding, supra note 213.
242 Id.
243 Charles Lee, N. Korean Broadcasts Allowed in South, UPI (Oct. 22, 1999),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1999/10/22/N-Korean-broadcasts-allowed-in-
South/9258940564800/ [https://perma.cc/M686-TP67].
244 Dave Klingler, Satellite-Jamming Becoming a Big Problem in the Middle East and
North Africa, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 28, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/
science/2012/03/satellite-jamming-becoming-a-big-problem-in-the-middle-east/
[https://perma.cc/T35S-HTN6]; cf. Sonne & Fassihi, supra note 16.
245 Dan Williams, Egyptian Jamming of Sinai Insurgents Disrupts Phones in Israel,
Gaza, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-egypt-telecoms/egyp-
tian-jamming-of-sinai-insurgents-disrupts-phones-in-israel-gaza-idUSKCN1GJ1K3
[https://perma.cc/V4JK-W4UY] (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:56 AM).
246 Joel Gulhane, Al Jazeera Accuses Armed Forces of Jamming Satellite Signals, DAILY
NEWS EGYPT (Sept. 4, 2013), https://dailyfeed.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/04/
al-jazeera-accuses-armed-forces-of-jamming-satellite-signals/ [https://perma.cc/
48NC-AEXC].
247 See BERG, supra note 13, at 47.
248 Steve Lambakis, Foreign Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. National Secur-
ity, NAT’L INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y 17 (2017), https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads
/2021/03/Foreign-Space-Capabilities-pub-2017-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F35L-
4KJB].
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a violation of ITU obligations under Article 45 of the ITU Con-
stitution.249 Thus, intentional jamming “violates the principle of
international recognition under the ITU Radio Regulations.”250
However, being an international wrong and not living up to the
ITU Convention do not make broadcast jamming a use of
force.251 Communication interruptions appear to be accepted
and do not receive much condemnation other than public
shaming.252
Turning to cyberspace, Russia has engaged in similar interfer-
ence by cyber means like it has in other forms of electromag-
netic interference. According to the U.K.’s National
Cybersecurity Center, Russia shut down the French television
station TV5Monde.253 The Russian military intelligence hacking
team (i.e., Fancy Bear) likely carried this out.254 When Russia
jammed the BBC and VOA, its behavior was condemned but not
declared a use of force.255
There is also some evidence that the United States has not
treated interference by cyber means as a use of force. In 2011
and 2012, there were two waves of DDoS cyber operations
against some of the world’s largest financial institutions, such as
Bank of America and JPMorgan.256 Media outlets and unnamed
officials of President Obama’s administration blamed Iran for
the DDoS operations.257 President Obama’s administration se-
249 Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication
Union, art. 45, Dec. 22, 1992, 1825 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter ITU Constitution].
250 Mountin, supra note 35, at 134–35; see Radio Regulations of the Int’l
Telecomm. Union art. 15 (2020 ed.), https://www.itu.int/en/myitu/Publica-
tions/ 2020/09/02/14/23/Radio-Regulations-2020 [https://perma.cc/8KD4-
KM3G]. Part of the ITU’s lack of ability to address interference during peacetime
is because under Article 48 of the ITU Constitution, military radio installations
are generally exempt with some caveats such as avoiding interference, to the ex-
tent possible, with distress messages. ITU Constitution, supra note 249, art. 48; see
Housen-Couriel, supra note 41, at 451–52 (even during peacetime, military radio
installations are generally exempt from the requirement to avoid harmful inter-
ference except with regard to distress messaging).
251 See Metzl, supra note 239, at 639.
252 See id. at 638.
253 See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 5, at 25.
254 See id. at 19.
255 See id. at 25.
256 See id. at 85.
257 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks on U.S. Banks and Com-
panies, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/iran-blamed-for-cyberattacks/2012/09/21/afbe2be4-0412-11e2-
9b24-ff730c7f6312_story.html [https://perma.cc/LWH2-RGA3]; see also CLARKE
& KNAKE, supra note 5, at 85.
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lected a limited response and chose to treat the cyber opera-
tions “like any other mildly disruptive internet activity.”258 The
response included the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) notifying the owners of infected accounts to delete the
malware and slow the DDoS cyber operations.259 The decision to
have DHS notify affected users and the fact that DoD did not
respond with a kinetic attack is indicative that the United States
did not view the actions as a use of force.
D. INTERFERENCE BY CYBER MEANS CAUSING INTEROPERABILITY
AND FUNCTIONALITY ISSUES
The more contested issue to resolve is not if broadcast jam-
ming rises to a level of a use of force, but if interoperability is-
sues through interference rise to the level of a use of force. The
effects-based rationale would likely come to a similar conclusion
about broadcast jamming and cyber interference, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. For example, disruptions to National Football
League television coverage resulting in financial losses would
likely never rise to the level of a use of force under an effects-
based analysis.260 Instead, the determining factor for the effects-
based analysis would be the severity of consequences.261
Schmitt’s first and most significant factor in his seven-factor
effects-based analysis is “severity.”262 Under this factor, physical
harm to individuals or property would amount to a use of force,
whereas minor inconveniences would not.263 A related concept
under the Tallinn Manual is if interference by cyber means con-
stitutes an attack.264 There is not a consensus by Tallinn Manual
members, but a majority would find that the loss of functionality
qualifies as an armed attack if physical replacement of parts is
required for restoration.265
258 See id. at 86.
259 See id.
260 See Mountin, supra note 35, at 178.
261 See Schmitt, supra note 4, at 576; see also Mountin, supra note 35, at 178
(implying severity of consequence matters most in analyzing the jus ad bellum for
electronic jamming of satellites).
262 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 334.
263 See id.; see also Mountin, supra note 35, at 178.
264 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 4, at 417. Under Rule 92, a potential
“attack” through cyber interference is analyzed as more of a jus in bello analysis
than a jus ad bellum analysis; whether a cyber operation is an “attack” is based
solely on death, injury, or damage to objects. See id. at 415.
265 See id. at 417.
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One of the most cited examples for this proposition is when a
cyber operation is used to disable an air traffic control system,
causing airplanes to crash.266 Even scholars who primarily sup-
port an “instrument”-based approach, such as Duncan Hollis,
question the traditional U.N. Charter framework for a use of
force when an entire air traffic control system is shut down,
causing significant casualties.267 Additionally, the DoD Law of
War Manual states that disabling civilian air traffic control ser-
vices resulting in airplane crashes is a commonly cited example
of cyber activity that could amount to a use of force.268
However, custom around jamming calls into question this pre-
mise of functionality loss as a use of force. As discussed above, in
the spring of 2016, North Korea jammed GPS signals on at least
100 occasions, affecting the functionality of 962 planes.269 How-
ever, this was not the first time that North Korea jammed air-
plane communication or navigation. As early as 1977, North
Korea jammed planes’ communications signals.270 In 2012,
North Korea jammed 1,016 airplanes and 254 ships—grounding
flights and keeping ships in port.271
North Korea is not alone in jamming GPS signals. Moscow
also frequently jams GPS signals. In fact, Moscow has jammed
GPS signals beyond the previously mentioned 9,833 instances of
266 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 103, at 916; Silver, supra note 135, at 91 (argu-
ing a cyber operation that disables air traffic control system and causes planes to
crash is a use of force).
267 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 1042 (raising questions in the context of air traf-
fic control and plane crash scenario).
268 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 16.3.1 (citing Koh Remarks,
supra note 24). According to DoD regulations, electronic warfare can have navi-
gation warfare “effects by protecting or denying transmitted . . . (GNSS) or other
radio navigation aid signals.” JP FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE, supra note 36, § I-16.
This is done by “degrading, disrupting, or deceptively manipulating [position,
navigation, and timing] transmissions.” Id.
269 Mizokami, supra note 221; see also North Korea ‘Jamming GPS Signals’ Near
South Border, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
35940542 [https://perma.cc/L23H-5S2G].
270 John Saar, American ‘Rat Racers’ Train Hard to Defend South Korea, WASH. POST
(June 10, 1977), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/06/
10/american-rat-racers-train-hard-to-defend-south-korea/ed8b56f6-a931-47ae-
84fb-9e60b2325ed1/ [https://perma.cc/2ETS-8VRV] (“North Koreans some-
times attempt to jam communications among U.S. planes . . . .”).
271 Jonathan Saul, Governments Confront Rising Threat to Ships from Signal Jam-
ming, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/shipping-navigation-gps-id
USL5N0E926V20130530 [https://perma.cc/8TQD-4A7H] (May 30, 2013, 9:15
AM).
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GPS interference.272 Moscow has caused interference involving
1,311 commercial vessels that were coming from locations in
Russia and Russian-controlled areas.273 As early as 1982, Moscow
engaged in jamming GPS signals, including those in Colorado
and Hawaii used for navigation by airplanes and ships.274 How-
ever, the United States did not publicly indicate the activity as a
use of force. Rather than a DoD response, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission Chairman stated that if the action contin-
ued, the United States would make a complaint to the Soviet
Union.275 The United States would likely have been more ag-
gressive if it viewed the interference as a use of force.
Recently, Norway has accused Russia of jamming critical GPS
and other communication systems. During multiple NATO exer-
cises since 2017, “blocking” signals coming from Russia have im-
pacted military aircraft and vessels in and around Norway and
Finland.276 During a major NATO exercise from October
through November 2018, the jamming intensified, threatening
both military and civil aviation.277 At first, the Russians denied
the jamming took place.278 However, Norway and Finland
claimed they were able to demonstrate that Russia caused the
jamming.279 Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde, the head
272 C4ADS, supra note 218, at 15 (using Automatic Identification System (AIS)
ship location data collected at scale, C4ADS identified the 9,833 instances of in-
terference that appear to have originated from Russia).
273 See id. The raw number of times jamming occurs in less than a year is re-
vealing of how commonplace Russian jamming is in international territories. See
id. C4ADS is a non-profit security organization that partnered with the University
of Texas at Austin for a study of GPS jamming in Russia. See id. at 2. A reasonable
conclusion can be drawn that Russian jamming of navigational signals has oc-
curred much more than 9,833 times because this was a study done for a short
time period. See id. at 3 (the study was done for a year, ending in November
2018). However, even if jamming has only occurred 9,833 times, that in itself is a
high mark for consistent State practice in the area of jamming—at least by
Russia.
274 Chandler, supra note 15.
275 Id.
276 Gerard O’Dwyer, Norway Accuses Russia of Jamming Its Military Systems, DEF.
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/03/
08/norway-alleges-signals-jamming-of-its-military-systems-by-russia/ [https://
perma.cc/MH3H-T7EZ].
277 See Associated Press, Norway Says GPS Jamming During the Biggest NATO War
Game in Decades a Big Problem for the Military and Civilians, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 11,
2019, 8:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/norway-gps-jamming-during-
nato-drills-in-2018-a-big-concern-2019-2 [https://perma.cc/4XB4-JXKV].
278 See O’Dwyer, supra note 276.
279 See Nerijus Adomaitis, Norway Says It Proved Russian GPS Interference During
NATO Exercises, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-defence-
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of Norwegian Intelligence Service, stated, “Jamming is also a
threat to, among other things, to civilian air traffic, police and
medical-related operations in peacetime.”280 The statement
reveals Norway’s view that it was peacetime, rather than hostile,
action. There is no indication from Lieutenant General Morten
Haga Lunde that Norway, a NATO member, viewed this jam-
ming as a use of force.281 Instead, the Norwegian response fol-
lows a common theme with GPS jamming of aircraft: a
complaint might be filed against the offending party, but no Ar-
ticle 51 defensive measures or referrals to the U.N. Security
Council are taken.282
The United States has also engaged in jamming of naviga-
tional aids outside of an armed conflict. In 1987, during three
days of Iranian military exercises called Operation Martyrdom,
the United States used radar-jamming aircraft to jam Iranian ra-
dars, causing systems to malfunction.283 The United States
jammed the Iranian training radars because the radars had
homed-in on the U.S. naval ships as part of “pre-firing drills” for
their missiles.284 There was no declared conflict between the
United States and Iran.
More recently, in 2018 and 2019, the U.S. Navy engaged in
wide-scale GPS jamming along the southeastern coast of the
United States.285 The majority of this jamming was part of an
exercise conducted by a Carrier Strike Group.286 In one exer-
cise, GPS jamming was projected to extend to the Florida Keys
and included parts of the northwestern Bahamas.287
russia-idUSKCN1QZ1WN [https://perma.cc/S9M5-9G3Q] (Mar. 18, 2019, 10:58
AM).
280 O’Dwyer, supra note 276 (emphasis added).
281 See id.
282 See Adomaitis, supra note 279.
283 Iran Radar Jammed by U.S. Planes—Anti-Ship, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 7,
1987, at A-1.
284 Id.
285 SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note 218, at 3-13.
286 Id.
287 Max Chesnes, FAA: Navy Exercise Might Affect GPS Signals in Small Planes Fly-
ing Along Southeast, TC PALM, https://www.tcpalm.com/story/news/local/indian-
river-county/2020/01/17/gps-affected-navy-exercise-southeast-florida-small-
planes-faa/4499470002/ [https://perma.cc/4CSQ-LD9J] (Jan. 21, 2020, 2:41
PM); Mark Collins & Zachery Lashway, GPS Jamming May Shut Down Navigation,
WJXT NEWS4JAX, https://www.news4jax.com/weather/2020/01/17/gps-jam-
ming-may-shut-down-navigation-in-southeast/ [https://perma.cc/K6SG-CDF4]
(Jan. 20, 2020, 10:46 AM). The projected jamming of January 2020 Navy exercise
may have also affected Cuban territorial waters by comparing the map published
in the U.S.A. Today story and a map of the U.S. territorial sea. See Chesnes, supra;
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Additionally, there have been multiple reports of Chinese
jammers being placed on the islands in the South China Sea
and jamming of GPS signals near the Port of Shanghai.288 Chi-
nese GPS jamming began in 2018, and by July 2019, over 300
ships were affected.289 In other words, GPS jamming is on the
rise and is not limited to one nation.
The effects-based supporter may question this widespread and
systematic jamming of aircraft GPS and find that the conse-
quences’ severity still has not reached the appropriate level of
harm. In 2002, Dan Silver, an effects-based supporter, explained
how some scholars note the absence of state actions following
airplane crashes caused by cyber interference indicates that
there is a lack of customary international law.290 According to
Silver, this may be due to the recent development of cyber oper-
ations.291 However, it has been eighteen years since Silver made
this observation and wide-scale civilian airplane crashes through
cyberspace have not occurred.292 Cyberspace may never cause
the degree of destruction on air traffic control systems as previ-
ously theorized.
The international flying community has accepted GPS jam-
ming as the norm and has adjusted accordingly. For example,
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) identified
sixty-five interference incidents between 2017–2018 in the Mid-
dle East Region.293 In its 2016 Global Air Navigation Plan, ICAO
recommended that because of the vulnerability of GPS signals to
interference, conventional radio navigation aids should be re-
cf. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Maritime Limits & Boundaries,
https://nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/data/us-maritime-limits-and-boundaries.html
[https://perma.cc/M662-FTNY] (map and coordinates of the U.S. territorial
sea).
288 SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note 218, at x, 1-16.
289 Id. “The effect of the spoofing was also unique: the position of the ships was
jumping every few minutes in a ring pattern that showed as large circles over
weeks.” Id.
290 See Silver, supra note 135, at 78.
291 Id.
292 See Schmitt, supra note 103, at 887; see also Lee Rainie, Janna Anderson &
Jennifer Connolly, Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2014)
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-in-
crease/ [https://perma.cc/RU2N-RGMG].
293 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], MIDANPIRG Commc’n, Navigation & Sur-
veillance Sub-Grp.: CNS Plan. & Implementation in the MID Region, at 2, ICAO Doc.
CNS SG/9-WP/12 (2019), https://www.icao.int/MID/Documents/2019/
CNS%20SG9/CNS%20SG9-WP12-%20GNSS%20Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4TQ9-UNT5].
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tained, and alternative navigation solutions should be created as
a backup.294 There is no doubt that continued reliance on con-
ventional radio navigation aids or other navigation solutions is
due to the interference of GPS.295
The vulnerability of GPS as targets is also not purely hypothet-
ical. In July 2020, a ransomware attack took place on one of the
pilots’ underlying systems to store flight planning and FAA’s aer-
onautical database to update GPS routes.296 While the incident
was far from trivial and several aircraft were grounded for days,
it showed how flying has built-in redundancies to deal with cyber
threats since many pilots relied on backup systems and could
continue their planned routes.297 The pilots who did not have
updated GPS or backup systems did not take off because specific
rules prevented them from flying without updated navigation
routes.298 Thus, an aircraft accident caused by interference
through cyber means is unlikely due to the lack of advanced
planning and recognition that cyber threats can target GPS.
One could argue that if there is a wide-scale interference by
cyber means in which multiple planes crashed, that would be
considered a use of force. Such an idea is a realpolitik argument
that losing life and property would call for a forceful response.
294 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], 2016–2030 Global Air Navigation Plan, at
100, ICAO Doc. 9750-AN/963 (5th ed. 2016), https://www.icao.int/publica-
tions/Documents/9750_5ed_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACF3-63B2].
295 See id. Unintentional interference does not even have to be broadcasting on
the same frequency; it can be caused by solar effects. See Int’l Civil Aviation Org.
[ICAO], supra note 293, at 23. “GNSS signals are delayed by varying amounts of
time depending on the density of ionized particles (ionosphere) which itself de-
pends on the intensity of solar radiation and other solar energy bursts. The solar
activity can cause GNSS service to be degraded or temporarily lost.” Id.
296 Lily Hay Newman, A Cyberattack on Garmin Disrupted More Than Workouts,
WIRED (July 27, 2020, 7:53 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/garmin-outage-
ransomware-attack-workouts-aviation/ [https://perma.cc/B5XY-NJWJ] (“The fly-
Garmin and Garmin Pilot apps both suffered days-long outages, hindering some
Garmin hardware used in planes, including flight-planning mechanisms and the
ability to update mandatory FAA aeronautical databases.”). A ransomware attack
is a form of malware attack where an outside user encrypts files and then de-
mands ransom to restore access, usually in the form of Bitcoin. Josh Fruhlinger,
Ransomware Explained: How It Works and How to Remove It, CSO (June 19, 2020,
3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3236183/what-is-ransomware-
how-it-works-and-how-to-remove-it.html [https://perma.cc/W8BA-N2CT].
297 See Newman, supra note 296.
298 Id.
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Besides being unlikely, attribution is another problem with this
hypothetical.299
However, even if interference by cyber means can be attrib-
uted to a State, the victim State could potentially use force in
that hypothetical under preemptive self-defense.300 This is be-
cause such an action carried out by the offending State could be
interpreted as the preparatory stages of an upcoming armed at-
tack. A State would likely engage in intentional cyber interfer-
ence of GPS to cause multiple airplane crashes only in
preparation for an armed attack. This scenario is like the jam-
ming of reconnaissance satellites that monitor nuclear weapons
sites. If several of these satellites are jammed, it would not be a
299 See Beard, supra note 20, at 78–80; see also THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR WILL
NOT TAKE PLACE 141 (2017) (technical issues with attribution are difficult to
overcome in cyber).
300 The ICJ intentionally avoided addressing anticipatory self-defense in the
Nicaragua case. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 347, ¶ 172 (June 27) (dissenting opin-
ion by Schwebel, J.) ( “[The ICJ] rightly observes that the issue of the lawfulness
of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised in this
case, and that the Court accordingly expresses no view on that issue.”). Anticipa-
tory self-defense is permitted if the U.N. Security Council has not had the oppor-
tunity to act and immediacy, necessity, and proportionality call for forceful action
in response to an anticipated armed attack. See Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-
Defence Under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 69, 79, 97–98 (2003). The
concept of preemptive self-defense in international law is established from the
Caroline Affair in 1837. See Howard Jones, The Caroline Affair, 38 HISTORIAN 485,
485 (1976). British forces entered the United States, seized the ship, The Caroline
(which was being loaded with men and supplies to support a rebellion in Ca-
nada), set it on fire, and sent it over Niagara Falls. See id. at 485, 491. The U.S.
representative, Daniel Webster, acknowledged the right to preemptive self-de-
fense in a letter to his British counterpart, Henry S. Fox, stating “[i]t will be for
[the U.K.] Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Letter from
Daniel Webster to Henry S. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 123, 132 (1848); see also
BOWETT, supra note 133, at 188–92 (asserting that Article 51 does not preclude
actions taken against an imminent danger); Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-De-
fense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
187, 200–02 (1984) (asserting that because the U.N. Charter is silent on the issue
of defensive use of anticipatory force, a presumption that preemptive attacks are
permitted exists). This is a high standard for preemptive self-defense indicating
that there would have to be a clear sign that a State’s interference by cyber means
on the GPS systems—causing planes to crash—is evidence of a pending instant
and overwhelming attack.
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use of force in and of itself but could indicate an impending
armed attack.301
Additionally, nothing is preventing a State subject to interfer-
ence by cyber means—such as GPS interference causing multi-
ple airplane crashes—from going to the U.N. Security Council
and receiving authorization to respond with Chapter VII ac-
tions.302 The U.N. Security Council could authorize Chapter VII
measures even if there was not a use of force.303
Finally, there is no serious attempt to label communication
satellite jamming as a use of force, “all that has been done to
make the jammers pay the consequences of their interference is
‘naming and shaming.’”304 Naming and shaming is a far cry
from self-defense actions and calls into question whether any
stand-alone interference activity could ever rise to the level of a
use of force.305 Naming and shaming is more in line with a low-
301 The United States and the former Soviet Union signed an agreement in
1971 that requires immediate notification to the other party if either detects
“signs of interference” with the missile warning systems for nuclear weapons.
Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
4 (2012), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/a-history-of-ASAT-
programs_lo-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/T48Z-J5SJ]. A key factor in determining
if anticipatory self-defense is justified is the nature of the weapon. See Van den
hole, supra note 300, at 101. If the threat assessment determines a nuclear strike
is justified, then anticipatory self-defense is more likely justified. See id.
302 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the exis-
tence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.11.4 (rationales for the
Resort of Force include self-defense and use of force authorized by the U.N. Se-
curity Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations).
303 See U.N. Charter art. 39. Under Article 39, Chapter VII actions allow the
Security Council to take Article 41 or Article 42 action if there is a “threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” that is not an armed attack or a
use of force. Id.; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 135 (acts of aggression may
consist of measures short of war and are not crimes against peace).
304 Lambakis, supra note 248, at 18.
305 Besides customary international law on behavior, there is one custom-based
international agreement that Russia and the United States do not view jamming
and other forms of electromagnetic interference as a use of force. See Agreement
on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities art. 6, June 12, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
879. In June 1989, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the agreement
that addressed interference with command-and-control networks. Id. The agree-
ment is indicative of the widespread jamming since there would be no need for
an agreement of activity that was not occurring between the United States and
Soviets. Also, the agreed response to an electromagnetic interference was for the
offended party “[to] inform the relevant personnel of the armed forces of the
other party.” Id. This is a far cry from declaring these actions as hostile; the pro-
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level international wrong than a use of force. The authorization
to use force must be more than a mere abstraction based on
prospective behavior.306 Thus, the most commonly cited exam-
ple of a stand-alone cyber operation being a use of force is a
poor demonstration that interference by cyber means can be
classified as a use of force.
E. SATELLITE BLINDING
Moreover, the interoperability and functionality position of
effects-based reasoning is questioned in light of other activities.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States
also likely engaged in electromagnetic interference of satellites
through “blinding,” “illuminating,” or “dazzling.”307 Interfer-
ence by blinding or dazzling satellites was not publicly labeled as
a use of force during the Cold War or more recent State
practice.308
The DoD does not always use the term blinding or illuminat-
ing in reference to satellite interference, and sometimes prefers
cess of notification of an activity already occurring is more in line with confi-
dence building measures for a future arms control agreement rather than a use
of force in itself.
306 William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557, 557 (2003) (“In the end, each use of force must find
legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the state believes have made it nec-
essary. Each should be judged not on abstract concepts, but on the particular
events that gave rise to it.”).
307 See Richard Sale, Exclusive Graphic Soviet Lasers Said to Zap U.S. Spy Satellites,
UNITED PRESS INT’L (Jan. 23, 1988), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/01/
23/Exclusive-Graphic-Soviet-lasers-said-to-zap-US-spy-satellites/8407569912400/
#:~:text=the%20suspected%20Soviet%20laser%20’hosings,system%2C%20the
%20sources%20told%20UPI [https://perma.cc/JX7L-SJJQ]; Thomas O’Toole,
Space Wars, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 1977), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/opinions/1977/11/06/space-wars/cb2edd42-cbb4-42ba-8514-202080dc-
cafe/ [https://perma.cc/34FL-XNS4].
308 See, e.g., Grego, supra note 301, at 10. Currently, the United States, Russia,
and China all have lasers that can be used to disable or interfere with satellites.
See id. at 10–11. The United States has acknowledged that testing occurred in the
early 1990s. See id. at 7.
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the term dazzling.”309 In addition, the United States does not
consider certain lasers that jam or dazzle satellites as weapons.310
Related to blinding is the term “directed energy,” which is the
umbrella term for a type of operation that is used to “incapaci-
tate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities,
[and] personnel” through electromagnetic energy and atomic
or subatomic particles.311 Blinding is used in some vocabulary
309 The Army is further developing “laser dazzlers to blind surveillance satel-
lites and jammers to disrupt communications and surveillance satellites.” Space
and U.S. National Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. 10 (2006) [hereinafter O’Hanlon Statement]
(statement of Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at The
Brookings Institute). “Just as a satellite’s receiver can be swamped by a jamming
signal, a satellite’s optical sensor can be dazzled by swamping it with light that is
brighter than what it is trying to image.” WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra
note 223, at 125. “Dazzlers are essentially lasers designed to blind electro-optical
surveillance satellites much the way shining a flashlight at a camera would blind
the camera as it takes the picture.” Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless
Weapons”? The Need to Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implica-
tions of Defining Them as “Weapons,” 66 A.F. L. REV. 157, 177 n.120 (2010) (citing
O’Hanlon Statement, supra. Using the term “dazzling” might be due in part to
avoid confusing it with “blinding lasers” which are prohibited from being di-
rected at human beings on the ground that it would cause permanent blindness,
outlined in the following U.N. protocol. See Additional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects: Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, S. Treaty
Doc. 105-1C, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370 [hereinafter CCW Protocol IV]. The United
States is a party to CCW Protocol IV. Id.
[E]ye-safe lasers that exist today as nonlethal “laser dazzlers” do not
meet the definition of a blinding laser weapon found in CCW Pro-
tocol IV; however, the United States and Australia required and
conducted a legal review on each and every type of ‘dazzling laser’
prior to their acquisition and deployment by their militaries.
Blake & Imburgia, supra, at 201 n.256.
310 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 19, § 6.15.1.1 n.383 (“Choice of the
term weapon was intentional to distinguish the prohibited system from lasers
which are used for rangefinding, jamming, dazzling, communications, weapons
guidance, and similar purposes.”) (citing W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to the
Judge Advocate General of the Army for Law of War Matters, Memorandum of Law:
Travaux Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol, re-
printed in THE ARMY LAWYER 33, 36 (June 1997)); see also ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS,
supra note 41, para. 2-83 (“Lasers—may be used to temporarily dazzle or perma-
nently blind mission-critical sensors on a satellite.”).
311 JP FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE, supra note 36, at I-16. “Directed energy” oper-
ations also include all forms of lasers, including those that cause blinding, and
anti-satellite lasers. Id. Directed energy weapons fall into a different anti-satellite
capability than kinetic based anti-satellite capabilities. See Blake & Imburgia, supra
note 309, at 177; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-479, ELEC-
TRONIC WARFARE: DOD ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND OVER-
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because it is easier to frame terminology based on a satellite’s
functionality.312
During the Cold War, the Soviets engaged in satellite interfer-
ence through blinding on several occasions. In 1975, the Soviet
Union emanated a beam to blind three U.S. satellites.313 Specifi-
cally, “Capt. G.R. Villar, former director of British naval intelli-
gence, wrote in 1979 that on five occasions the Soviets
‘illuminated U.S. satellites for periods of up to four hours with
[the] power of up to 1,000 times that seen in a forest fire or an
ICBM launching.’”314 Some U.S. intelligence analysts believe the
Soviets caused the permanent damage of U.S. reconnaissance
satellites.315
Intelligence reports in the 1980s indicated that the Soviet la-
ser system posed a significant threat to U.S. satellites.316 How-
ever, the Soviet laser system capabilities appeared more
disruptive than destructive.317 While the extent of Soviet Union
blinding is not clear, the U.S. response is still illustrative for the
jus ad bellum analysis. The United States did not declare any per-
ceived Soviet Union satellite blinding as a use of force. Instead,
the United States response in the 1980s was to further finance
and develop their own directed-electromagnetic energy anti-sat-
ellite capabilities with the Mid-Infrared Chemical Laser
testing.318
SIGHT 5 (2012) (directed energy use includes jamming enemy communications
or jamming radar on the electromagnetic spectrum).
312 See, e.g., Kyle Mizokami, China Could Blind U.S. Satellites with Lasers, POPULAR
MECHS. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/
a29307535/china-satellite-laser-blinding/ [https://perma.cc/9H8U-R55C]. Gen-
eral John Raymond, commander of SPACECOM and U.S. Air Force Space Com-
mand, stated, “We’re pretty comfortable [in asserting] that they [China] are
developing directed energy weapons—probably building lasers to blind our satel-
lites.” Id.; see also Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack
on Commercial Space Systems—Reexamining “Self-Defense” in Outer Space in Light of the
Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1213,
1224 (2002) (referring to the Soviet Union using “blinding” lasers on U.S.
satellites).
313 See Petras, supra note 312, at 1224.
314 Sale, supra note 307.
315 Id. (“According to several U.S. intelligence and aerospace industry sources,
a KH-11 or Code 1010 satellite, sustained permanent damage in 1978 when it was
‘hosed’ by a Soviet laser. These sources believe that such incidents have contin-
ued up to the present.”).
316 See Grego, supra note 301, at 6.
317 Id.
318 Id.; see also Blake & Imburgia, supra note 309, at 178.
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There is a possibility that the Soviet’s potential blinding of
U.S. satellites was not one-sided. “Although official U.S. policy
[was] not to interfere with Soviet satellites, U.S. officials ac-
knowledged the United States had done ‘mild hosings’ of Soviet
satellites trying to observe the launch of U.S. missiles” with laser
beams coming from Hawaii and California.319 Mild hosing is a
reference to blinding a satellite by temporarily interfering with
its sensing capabilities.320
Temporary blinding is the type of electromagnetic interfer-
ence that closely mirrors interference by cyber means.321 The
majority of the blinding incidents of U.S. satellites were tempo-
rary and could be classified as interference during a time of
non-declared hostilities.322 Satellite blinding during peacetime
demonstrates that satellite interference by cyber means likely
does not rise to the level of a use of force.323
Looking to a more modern example of blinding in China, in
2006, Chinese lasers fired at U.S. reconnaissance satellites in
low-earth orbit, causing temporary issues with the sensors but
creating no lasting damage.324 China acknowledged it fired the
lasers; denied that it attempted to blind the U.S. satellites; and
claimed it conducted laser-ranging, -finding, or -illuminating to
trace the satellite’s location.325 However, the United States
viewed China’s action as more than identifying a satellite’s loca-
319 Sale, supra note 307.
320 Richard Sale, Despite Thaw, U.S. Continues ‘Hosing’ of Soviet Satellites, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 1991, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-
10-03-mn-4616-story.html [https://perma.cc/QVS9-56JF].
321 There are some indications that permanent blinding was performed by the
Soviets, but this is not as well established as with temporary blinding. See Sale,
supra note 307.
322 See id.
323 Many advocates believe that traditional electronic warfare, such as jamming
radio and communications systems, should be treated the same from an opera-
tional perspective as cyberspace attack operations. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFF., supra note 311, at 2. As stated in previous sections, there is evidence
jamming radio and communications systems and cyber operations should be
treated the same from a legal perspective to reflect this operational reality.
324 Andrea Shalal-Esa, China Jamming Test Sparks U.S. Satellite Concerns, STAR
(Oct. 5, 2006, 12:00 AM), https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2006/10/
05/china-jamming-test-sparks-us-satellite-concerns [https://perma.cc/ZV7L-
D8RT] (the director of the Pentagon’s National Reconnaissance Office con-
firmed the incident and said the U.S. satellite was not materially damaged); see
also Lambakis, supra note 248, at 24.
325 See Lambakis, supra note 248, at 24.
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tion.326 According to the European Space Agency, China also
dazzled French satellites in 2006.327 Thus, China engaged in be-
havior similar to the Soviet Union’s and the United States’ ac-
tions during the Cold War.
Satellite interference through blinding has never publicly
been declared a use of force by any State.328 Effects-based sup-
porters may argue that this could change with the right circum-
stances.329 However, that is another prospective argument that
fails to account for the historic State practice and lack of decla-
ration that it is a use of force after it has occurred. Thus, if elec-
tromagnetic interference by blinding or dazzling of satellites is
not considered a use of force, then a similar type of interference
by cyber means against satellites would also not be considered a
use of force.
F. SPOOFING
While various forms of electromagnetic interference have
been undertaken by multiple States for decades, demonstrating
systematic practice under international law, it is helpful to see a
newer technological approach. “Spoofing” is another form of a
directed energy operation and, depending on the manner of
manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum, has a similar jus ad
bellum analysis as jamming.330 There is less known State practice
in this area, making it difficult to determine if the behavior is a
use of force. Nonetheless, the few publicly known examples of
spoofing are illustrative of customary international law.
Spoofing is often lumped together with electromagnetic jam-
ming and may be seen as a sub-category of jamming. The Army
Space Operations Field Manual lists spoofing and electromag-
netic jamming in the same category.331 Likewise, some scholars
lump jamming and spoofing in the same category.332
326 U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, supra note 17, at 213 (perceiving
China’s leaders likely tempted to attack the U.S. space system rather than use
traditional war means).
327 Id.
328 See Mountin, supra note 35, at 176–77.
329 See id. at 177–78.
330 ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 41, paras. 2-81 to 2-83.
331 Id.
332 See, e.g., Mountin, supra note 35, at 130 (“Known as a type of electronic
decoy, spoofing is similar to jamming.”); see also Bourbonnière, supra note 40, at
58 (“Electronic weapons are used to interfere with satellite uplinks and downlinks
by either spoofing or jamming these links.”). For example, the 9,833 instances of
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International bodies seem to approach spoofing and jamming
in a similar manner, especially in GPS interference. For in-
stance, ICAO views jamming and spoofing as forms of inten-
tional interference, and standards for handling both are
similar.333 Thus, in some ways spoofing and jamming are two
sides of the same electromagnetic-interference coin.
Nonetheless, there are some differences between spoofing
and jamming. The Army Field Manual explains that “[s]poofing
is a technique of broadcasting an emulated signal with false or
misleading information in an attempt to deceive a receiver or
system into processing the fake data.”334 Spoofing is different
from jamming because it mimics the true signals, whereas jam-
ming drowns out the real signal.335 However, GPS users typically
know they are jammed because the interference causes their sys-
tem to fail to function. Alternatively, when someone is spoofed,
they are less likely to know because they believe that the false
signal is correct.336 Thus, there are some differences between
jamming and spoofing, even though both are sometimes
lumped together.
One instance of Russian spoofing includes an Israeli airport
from June 2019. Israel complained that Russian spoofing caused
missing data for pilots and had a “significant impact” on airport
operations.337 Rather than admitting it was its electronic warfare
system emanating from its base over 200 miles away, Russia de-
nied its role in the spoofing.338
Iran has also possibly engaged in a sophisticated form of
spoofing against a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency drone in
2011. After capturing the U.S. drone, Iranian electronic warfare
specialists claimed they cut off communications to the drone
GPS interference by Russia previously cited had jamming and spoofing in the
same category. C4ADS, supra note 218, at 15.
333 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], supra note 293, at 23.
334 ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 41, para. 2-83.
335 See Mountin, supra note 35, at 130 (citing WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND,
supra note 223, at 118).
336 See Bourbonnière, supra note 40, at 58.
337 Russia Denies Role in Israeli Airport GPS Jamming, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48786085 [https://perma.cc/5PN3-
4HCG].
338 See id. The spoofing of an Israeli airport requires a different jus ad bellum
analysis from the other situations because this has the potential to be a form of
electronic warfare that is part of a larger conflict in the physical world. Essen-
tially, since Russian planes are dropping bombs in Syria, there is already an
armed conflict nearby, and this could be a collateral consequence of that nearby
conflict.
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and reconfigured the GPS coordinates to make it land in Iran
rather than its designed landing location in Afghanistan.339 The
United States did not respond by claiming it was a use of force
but simply asked for the drone’s return.340 There are different
geopolitical factors at play for the U.S. response and questions
about what occurred.341 Nonetheless, if Iran spoofed a drone to
capture it, this demonstrates that even the capture of military
equipment through spoofing does not rise to the level of a use
of force.
Another example of electromagnetic interference involves
China’s series of cyber operations directed at U.S. satellites from
2007 to 2008.342 The first three incidents involved electromag-
netic interference similar to jamming or spoofing, except China
likely conducted the interference by cyber means. Specifically,
in October 2007, the U.S. Landsat-7 (a U.S. observation satel-
lite) “experienced 12 or more minutes of interference,” which
occurred again in July 2008 for the same amount of time.343 In
June 2008, another U.S. observation satellite, the Terra EOS,
“experienced two or more minutes of interference,” and China
was believed to be the culprit.344 However, the satellite took all
the steps to command the Terra EOS in this instance but did
339 Scott Peterson & Payam Faramarzi, Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says
Iranian Engineer, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 15, 2011), https://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-
US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer [https://perma.cc/KQ5M-ZNEF]; see also Frank
Oliveri, The Pentagon’s GPS Problem, CQ WEEKLY (Feb. 9, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://
public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004218242.html?src=DB
[https://perma.cc/UFY4-ST5Z] (“Iran’s capture of a U.S. military drone in 2011
is widely believed to have resulted from a spoofing attack where the drone pilot
accidentally landed the plane in Iran, believing it was landing at its base in Af-
ghanistan.”). The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) denied that it was spoofing
and claimed it was a faulty data stream that caused the drone to be downed in
Iran. See RID, supra note 299, at 15 (“After a ten-week review of the incident the
CIA reportedly found that a faulty data stream had caused operators to lose con-
tact with the drone, rather than Iranian interference or jamming.”); see also Adam
Rawnsley, Iran’s Alleged Drone Hack: Tough, but Possible, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:01
PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/12/iran-drone-hack-gps/ [https://
perma.cc/K6DB-ANBN] (indicating possibility that drone was spoofed but not in
manner described by Iranian engineer). However, the United States may be mak-
ing the claim so as to not admit one of its drones is capable of being hacked.




342 U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, supra note 17, at 216.
343 See id.
344 See id.
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not issue any commands.345 On October 22, 2008, Terra EOS
“experienced nine or more minutes of interference,” and the
party took all necessary steps to control the satellite “but did not
issue commands.”346
The cyber operation activities against Landsat and Terra EOS
are similar to other types of jamming or interference that cus-
tomary international law and Article 41 of the U.N. Charter indi-
cate are not a use of force. Like other electromagnetic incidents,
the United States does not publicly indicate these incidents are
a use of force. This cyber interference practice on U.S. satellites
shows a pattern among States to not declare electromagnetic in-
terference as a use of force.
G. HYPOTHETICAL CYBER OPERATIONS AND USE OF FORCE
Under the jus ad bellum analysis, a cyber operation could theo-
retically be a use of force if it is an activity beyond communica-
tion interruption under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter or
electromagnetic interference in which States have historically
engaged.347 Specifically if it involves using cyberspace as an ex-
tension of traditional weapons.
The control of a drone or satellite by directing it to crash could
be a use of force. However, it would likely need to be beyond
interference-type activities and thus would no longer be classi-
fied as interference by cyber means.
Another possibility of a cyber operation being a use of force is
a nuclear explosion within a country’s missile silo or reactor,
which may cause the traditional use of force analysis to be recal-
culated under the U.N. Charter. However, a nuclear explosion
caused through cyberspace is an improbable hypothetical scena-
rio.348 Reworking a jus ad bellum approach for cyberspace before
the actual use of force may be politically motivated and create a




347 See U.N. Charter art. 41.
348 RID, supra note 299, at 174. “[C]yber war theorists of the 2010s have never
experienced the actual use of a deadly cyber weapon, let alone one a devastating
one like ‘Little Boy.’. . . Based on a careful evaluation of the empirical record,
based on technical detail and trends, and based on the conceptual analysis
presented here, a future cyber-Hiroshima must be considered highly unlikely.”
Id.
349 See Waxman, supra note 6, at 451.
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It is worth noting what type of cyber operation is not a use of
force. Principally, acts of espionage do not rise to a use of
force.350 The Tallinn Manual and effects-based supporters draw
similar conclusions that cyber espionage does not amount to a
use of force.351 Additionally, interference in elections is likely a
violation of the non-intervention principle but does not rise to
the level of a use of force.352 These topics deserve their own
analysis, but cyber-espionage not being a use of force is over-
whelmingly the majority opinion.353
The type of cyber operation to rise to the level of a use of
force would likely have to be beyond mere electromagnetic in-
terference that States have engaged in for ninety years and have
become more technically advanced and targeted. Cyber opera-
tions would also likely have to be behavior beyond temporary or
partial interruption of communication as outlined in Article 41
of the U.N. Charter to be a use of force. Thus, interference by
cyber means is not a use of force.
V. CONCLUSION
Interference by cyber means as potential use of force should
be analyzed under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter and State prac-
tice of electromagnetic interference during peacetime. The
U.N. Charter framers did a remarkable job of defining and de-
veloping jus ad bellum for communication interruption. The or-
dinary meaning of Article 41 and the drafting history of the
U.N. Charter support the ordinary reading. Additionally, State
practice of jamming during peacetime has occurred for ninety
years, and nearly every nation has engaged in various forms of
electromagnetic interference involving GPS, television and ra-
dio broadcasts, and satellite operations.354 The status of jus ad
bellum for interference by cyber means may cause negative politi-
350 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 1050–51 (the overwhelming consensus is that
espionage is not an armed attack or use of force).
351 Schmitt, supra note 4, at 576 (“[E]spionage does not constitute a use of
force (or armed attack) under international law absent a nonconsensual physical
penetration of the target state’s territory, as in the case of a warship or military
aircraft which collects intelligence from within its territorial sea or airspace.”).
352 See Ney Remarks, supra note 87.
353 See Beard, supra note 20, at 69 (“In spite of dire, repeated predictions to the
contrary, a cyberwar (an armed conflict limited to cyber actions alone) may in
fact be unlikely.”); see also Patterson, supra note 63, at 975 (“Current manifesta-
tions of cyber attacks rarely achieve militaristic ends, but rather take the form of
espionage, crime, or political and economic coercion.”).
354 See BERG, supra note 13, at 44.
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cal, economic, or other effects. The solution to these negative
consequences lies in the traditional means of changing interna-
tional law.355
355 See generally Waxman, supra note 6 (discussing scholarship focused on how
international law might be interpreted or amended to take account of new tech-
nologies); Hollis, supra note 6 (proposing that a new set of rules should be in
place for information operations).
